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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Innovation, “Pure Information,” and the SEC Disclosure Paradigm &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Innovation, “Pure Information,” and the SEC Disclosure Paradigm</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/09/17/innovation-pure-information-and-the-sec-disclosure-paradigm/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=innovation-pure-information-and-the-sec-disclosure-paradigm</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 17 Sep 2012 12:50:40 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Financial Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Disclosure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Financial regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Information asymmetries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Innovation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SEC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities regulation]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[My article, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, &#8216;Pure Information,&#8217; and the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, published in June in the 2012 symposium issue of the Texas Law Review, offers a new conceptualization of the SEC disclosure paradigm that has been in place since the Depression, shows how that paradigm has been undermined by the modern process [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by June Rhee, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Monday, September 17, 2012 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">The following post comes to us from <a href="http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/huht/" target="_blank">Henry T. C. Hu</a>, Allan Shivers Chair in the Law of Banking and Finance at the University of Texas School of Law.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>My article, <a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=2083708" target="_blank">Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, &#8216;Pure Information,&#8217; and the SEC Disclosure Paradigm</a>, published in June in the 2012 symposium issue of the <em>Texas Law Review</em>, offers a new conceptualization of the SEC disclosure paradigm that has been in place since the Depression, shows how that paradigm has been undermined by the modern process of financial innovation, and offers possible ways ahead. Since its creation, the SEC’s totemic philosophy has been to promote a robust informational foundation. As a necessary corollary, the SEC’s approach has been incremental, generally not venturing into substantive decision-making (as to stock prices or otherwise).</p>
<p>The article starts by suggesting that this disclosure philosophy has always been largely implemented through what can be conceptualized as an “intermediary depiction” model. An intermediary—e.g., a corporation issuing shares—stands between the investor and an objective reality. The intermediary observes that reality, crafts a depiction of the reality’s pertinent aspects, and transmits the depiction to investors. Securities law directs depictions to be accurate and complete. “Information” is conceived of in terms of, if not equated to, such depictions.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/09/17/innovation-pure-information-and-the-sec-disclosure-paradigm/#more-32991" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Innovation, “Pure Information,” and the SEC Disclosure Paradigm">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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