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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Politicized Proxy Advisers vs. Individual Investors  &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Politicized Proxy Advisers vs. Individual Investors</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/10/28/politicized-proxy-advisers-vs-individual-investors/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=politicized-proxy-advisers-vs-individual-investors</link>
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		<pubDate>Sun, 28 Oct 2012 11:54:11 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Corporate Elections & Voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Institutional Investors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ISS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Manhattan Institute]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy advisors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder proposals]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder voting]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Editor’s Note: James R. Copland is the director of the Manhattan Institute&#8217;s Center for Legal Policy. This post is based on an article by Mr. Copland that first appeared in the Wall Street Journal. In the boardrooms of America’s largest corporations, a company with scarcely over $100 million in annual revenue and $10 million in [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="background: #F8F8F8;padding: 10px;margin-top: 5px;margin-bottom: 10px"><strong>Editor’s Note:</strong> <a href="http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/copland.htm" target="_blank">James R. Copland</a> is the director of the Manhattan Institute&#8217;s Center for Legal Policy. This post is based on an article by Mr. Copland that first appeared in the <em>Wall Street Journal</em>.</div>
<p>In the boardrooms of America’s largest corporations, a company with scarcely over $100 million in annual revenue and $10 million in profits commands directors’ full attention: the proxy advisory firm Institutional Shareholder Services. ISS advises pension funds, mutual funds and hedge funds on how to vote on corporate ballot items.</p>
<p>The company is the dominant proxy adviser, reporting 1,700 clients that manage an estimated $26 trillion in assets. But its role in corporate governance is largely a creation of federal regulations—and its positions on countless ballot items follow the lead of special-interest investors like labor-union pension funds and &#8220;socially responsible&#8221; investing vehicles, not those of the average diversified investor.</p>
<p>In 2011 and 2012, for example, every public company in the Fortune 200 held an advisory vote on executive pay as mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. According to an analysis by the Manhattan Institute, ISS recommended that shareholders vote against 44 compensation packages in 338 &#8220;say on pay&#8221; votes (13%), but a majority of shareholders opposed executive pay at only six companies (1.5%).</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/10/28/politicized-proxy-advisers-vs-individual-investors/#more-35222" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Politicized Proxy Advisers vs. Individual Investors">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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