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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Litigating Post-Close Merger Cases &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Litigating Post-Close Merger Cases</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/11/09/litigating-post-close-merger-cases/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=litigating-post-close-merger-cases</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/11/09/litigating-post-close-merger-cases/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 09 Nov 2012 14:12:01 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Court Cases]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mergers & Acquisitions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Merger litigation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder suits]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Shareholder lawsuits over mergers are as ubiquitous as they are meritless. The incidence of suits over public-company acquisitions rounds to always. It doesn’t matter how high the premium or how clean the deal: someone (usually, one of the same someones) will sue. The frequency of merger lawsuits has increased steadily over time. What has changed [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Boris Feldman, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, on Friday, November 9, 2012 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.borisfeldman.com" target="_blank">Boris Feldman</a> is a member of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich &amp; Rosati, P.C. Mr. Feldman and others at his firm were involved in some of the cases discussed. The views expressed in this post are those of Mr. Feldman and do not reflect those of his firm or clients.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>Shareholder lawsuits over mergers are as ubiquitous as they are meritless. The incidence of suits over public-company acquisitions rounds to always. It doesn’t matter how high the premium or how clean the deal: someone (usually, one of the same someones) will sue.</p>
<p>The frequency of merger lawsuits has increased steadily over time. What has changed more abruptly is their life cycle. Until recent years, once a deal closed, the lawsuit usually went away. If the plaintiffs had been unable to wring out a “therapeutic” settlement pre-close (usually, “enhanced” disclosure + a fee) they ignored or dismissed the case after the acquisition was complete. The conventional wisdom was that plaintiffs’ leverage &#8212; threatening to interfere with the deal &#8212; was gone, and so there was no longer a path to payday.</p>
<p>In several recent cases, however, plaintiffs’ merger lawyers have refined their business model. They keep the litigation alive post-close. They take extensive discovery, especially against the executives of the acquirer, who now control the pursestrings. This phenomenon occurs even in situations where objective factors suggest a lack of merit to the claims: e.g., high premium; no contesting bidders; overwhelming shareholder approval; customary deal terms.</p>
<p>Why are the plaintiff lawyers pursuing these cases?</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/11/09/litigating-post-close-merger-cases/#more-35755" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Litigating Post-Close Merger Cases">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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