The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu The leading online blog in the fields of corporate governance and financial regulation. Sat, 17 Oct 2026 11:30:30 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.5.13 https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/cropped-photography-4-e1706898544564-1-32x32.png CEO Employment Contracts and Non-compete Covenants – The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu 32 32 CEO Employment Contracts and Non-compete Covenants https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/11/20/ceo-employment-contracts-and-non-compete-covenants/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=ceo-employment-contracts-and-non-compete-covenants https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/11/20/ceo-employment-contracts-and-non-compete-covenants/#comments Tue, 20 Nov 2012 13:57:27 +0000 http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/?p=36431?d=20150105105415EST Posted by Randall S. Thomas, Vanderbilt University, on Tuesday, November 20, 2012
Editor's Note:

Randall S. Thomas is a John Beasley II Professor of Law and Business at Vanderbilt Law School.

In our recent working paper, When Do CEOs Have Covenants Not to Compete in Their Employment Contracts?, we undertake the first comprehensive study of contractual restrictions on CEOs’ post-employment competitive activities. The large random sample of nearly 1,000 CEO employment contracts for 500 companies was selected from the S&P 1500 from the 1990s through 2010. We find that about 70% of CEO contracts have post-employment competitive restrictions. We also find more covenants not to compete (CNCs or noncompetes) in longer-term employment contracts and at profitable firms. In addition, our study uses a nuanced state-by-state CNC strength of enforcement index to test the variance of CEO noncompetes across jurisdictions.

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