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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Important Questions about Activist Hedge Funds &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Important Questions about Activist Hedge Funds</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/03/09/important-questions-about-activist-hedge-funds/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=important-questions-about-activist-hedge-funds</link>
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		<pubDate>Sat, 09 Mar 2013 15:10:44 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Corporate Elections & Voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hedge funds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder activism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Short-termism]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/?p=41904?d=20150113105202EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In what can only be considered a form of extortion, activist hedge funds are preying on American corporations to create short-term increases in the market price of their stock at the expense of long-term value. Prominent academics are serving the narrow interests of activist hedge funds by arguing that the activists perform an important service [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Martin Lipton, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, on Saturday, March 9, 2013 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.wlrk.com/mlipton" target="_blank">Martin Lipton</a> is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &amp; Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton, <a href="http://www.wlrk.com/TNMirvis/" target="_blank">Theodore N. Mirvis</a>, <a href="http://www.wlrk.com/aoemmerich" target="_blank">Adam O. Emmerich</a>, <a href="http://www.wlrk.com/dckarp" target="_blank">David C. Karp</a>, <a href="http://www.wlrk.com/mgordon" target="_blank">Mark Gordon</a>, and <a href="http://www.wlrk.com/svniles" target="_blank">Sabastian V. Niles</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>In what can only be considered a form of extortion, activist hedge funds are preying on American corporations to create short-term increases in the market price of their stock at the expense of long-term value. Prominent academics are serving the narrow interests of activist hedge funds by arguing that the activists perform an important service by uncovering “under-valued” or “under-managed” corporations and marshaling the voting power of institutional investors to force sale, liquidation or restructuring transactions to gain a pop in the price of their stock. The activist hedge fund leads the attack, and most institutional investors make little or no effort to determine long-term value (and how much of it is being destroyed). Nor do the activist hedge funds and institutional investors (much less, their academic cheerleaders) make any effort to take into account the consequences to employees and communities of the corporations that are attacked. Nor do they pay any attention to the impact of the short-termism that their raids impose and enforce on all corporations, and the concomitant adverse impact on capital investment, research and development, innovation and the economy and society as a whole.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/03/09/important-questions-about-activist-hedge-funds/#more-41904" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Important Questions about Activist Hedge Funds">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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