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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Assessing Vague Shareholder Proposals Under Rule 14a 8(i)(3) &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Assessing Vague Shareholder Proposals Under Rule 14a 8(i)(3)</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/03/28/assessing-vague-shareholder-proposals-under-rule-14a-8i3/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=assessing-vague-shareholder-proposals-under-rule-14a-8i3</link>
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		<pubDate>Thu, 28 Mar 2013 13:22:52 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Corporate Elections & Voting]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Rule 14a-8]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Securities regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder proposals]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[During the 2012 proxy season, the SEC staff concurred that a number of high profile shareholder proposals could be excluded from company proxy statements because various key terms in the proposals were not adequately defined or explained within the text of the proposal and supporting statement. See e.g., WellPoint, Inc. (SEIU Master Trust) (avail. Feb. [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by John F. Olson and Amy L. Goodman, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, on Thursday, March 28, 2013 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.gibsondunn.com/lawyers/jolson" target="_blank">John F. Olson</a> is a founding partner of Gibson, Dunn &amp; Crutcher’s Washington, D.C. office and a visiting professor at the Georgetown Law Center; <a href="http://www.gibsondunn.com/lawyers/agoodman" target="_blank">Amy L. Goodman</a> is a partner and co-chair of the Securities Regulation and Corporate Governance practice group at Gibson, Dunn &amp; Crutcher LLP. The following post is based on a Gibson Dunn alert by Ms. Goodman, <a href="http://gibsondunn.com/lawyers/EIsing" target="_blank">Elizabeth Ising</a>, <a href="http://gibsondunn.com/lawyers/BLane" target="_blank">Brian Lane</a>, and <a href="http://gibsondunn.com/lawyers/RMueller" target="_blank">Ronald Mueller</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>During the 2012 proxy season, the SEC staff concurred that a number of high profile shareholder proposals could be excluded from company proxy statements because various key terms in the proposals were not adequately defined or explained within the text of the proposal and supporting statement. See e.g., WellPoint, Inc. (SEIU Master Trust) (avail. Feb. 24, 2012, recon. denied Mar. 27, 2012) (concurring with exclusion of an independent chair proposal that referred to the New York Stock Exchange standard of independence without defining it because “neither shareholders nor the company would be able to determine with any reasonable certainty exactly what actions or measures the proposal requires”); Textron Inc. (avail. Mar. 7, 2012) (arguing that a reference to the Rule 14a-8 eligibility requirements in a proxy access shareholder proposal was vague and indefinite, although the staff ultimately concurred with the exclusion of the shareholder proposal on other grounds); Dell Inc. (avail. Mar. 30, 2012) (concurring with the exclusion of a similar proxy access shareholder proposal because the proposal’s reference to the Rule 14a-8 eligibility requirements was vague and indefinite). While these no-action letters reflected long-standing SEC staff precedent, in the current proxy season, there has continued to be a large number of no-action requests arguing that various terms in shareholder proposals are undefined or vague and therefore excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(3).</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/03/28/assessing-vague-shareholder-proposals-under-rule-14a-8i3/#more-42504" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Assessing Vague Shareholder Proposals Under Rule 14a 8(i)(3)">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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