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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Responding to Objections to Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending (2): Claims of Special Interest Influence &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Responding to Objections to Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending (2): Claims of Special Interest Influence</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/04/10/responding-to-objections-to-shining-light-on-corporate-political-spending-2-claims-of-special-interest-influence/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=responding-to-objections-to-shining-light-on-corporate-political-spending-2-claims-of-special-interest-influence</link>
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		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Apr 2013 13:18:54 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Securities Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Citizens United v. FEC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Disclosure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Political spending]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rulemaking Petition on Corporate Political Spending]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SEC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[The SEC is expected to consider a rulemaking petition requesting that the SEC develop rules requiring that public companies disclose their spending on politics. The petition has received significant support—including more than 490,000 comment letters urging the SEC to act as advocated by the petition—but has also attracted opponents, including prominent members of Congress. The [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Lucian Bebchuk, Harvard Law School, and Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Columbia Law School, on Wednesday, April 10, 2013 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/" target="_blank">Lucian Bebchuk</a> is Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance at Harvard Law School. <a href="http://www.law.columbia.edu/fac/Robert_Jackson" target="_blank">Robert J. Jackson, Jr.</a> is Associate Professor of Law and Milton Handler Fellow at Columbia Law School. Bebchuk and Jackson served as co-chairs of the Committee on Disclosure of Corporate Political Spending, which filed a <a href="http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-637.pdf" target="_blank">rulemaking petition</a> requesting that the SEC require all public companies to disclose their political spending, discussed on the Forum <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/tag/rulemaking-petition-on-corporate-political-spending/">here</a>. Bebchuk and Jackson are also co-authors of <a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=1670085" target="_blank">Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?</a> and <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2142115" target="_blank">Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending</a>, coming out this month in the <em>Georgetown Law Journal</em>. This post is the second in a series of posts, based on the <em>Shining Light</em> article, in which Bebchuk and Jackson respond to objections to an SEC rule requiring disclosure of corporate political spending; the full series of posts is available <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/tag/shining-light-on-corporate-political-spending/">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>The SEC is expected to consider a <a href="http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-637.pdf" target="_blank">rulemaking petition</a> requesting that the SEC develop rules requiring that public companies disclose their spending on politics. The petition has received significant support—including more than 490,000 comment letters urging the SEC to act as advocated by the petition—but has also attracted opponents, including prominent members of Congress. The SEC recently <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/11/09/the-sec-is-now-actively-considering-the-rulemaking-petition-on-corporate-political-spending/" target="_blank">indicated</a> that it plans to address the petition’s request this year. Given the SEC’s expected consideration of the petition, we have written an article, <a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=2142115" target="_blank">Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending</a>, that puts forth a comprehensive case for the rulemaking advocated in the petition—and responds to each of the ten objections that opponents of the petition have raised.</p>
<p>In our <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/04/04/responding-to-objections-to-shining-light-on-corporate-political-spending-1-the-claim-of-immateriality/">post last week</a>, we explained why opponents’ claims that corporate spending on politics is immaterial to investors provide no basis for opposing rules requiring public companies to disclose their political spending. In this post, we focus on a second objection that opponents of these rules have raised: the claim that disclosure rules on political spending will empower shareholders who have special interests, such as pension funds, at the expense of other investors.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/04/10/responding-to-objections-to-shining-light-on-corporate-political-spending-2-claims-of-special-interest-influence/#more-43444" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Responding to Objections to Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending (2): Claims of Special Interest Influence">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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