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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Delaware Court of Chancery Criticizes Board’s Sale Process  &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Delaware Court of Chancery Criticizes Board’s Sale Process</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/06/04/delaware-court-of-chancery-criticizes-boards-sale-process-3/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=delaware-court-of-chancery-criticizes-boards-sale-process-3</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 04 Jun 2013 13:29:11 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[In Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings Inc., the Delaware Court of Chancery found that the directors of NetSpend likely breached their Revlon duty to obtain the highest price reasonably available for stockholders by pursuing a single-bidder strategy for selling the company. The board’s lack of knowledge as to the company’s value and related failure to contact [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Kobi Kastiel, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Tuesday, June 4, 2013 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">The following post comes to us from <a href="http://www.paulweiss.com/professionals/partners-and-counsel/robert-b-schumer.aspx" target="_blank">Robert B. Schumer</a>, chair of the Corporate Department at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &amp; Garrison LLP, and is based on a Paul Weiss client memorandum. This post is part of the <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/the-delaware-law-series/">Delaware law</a> series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/the-delaware-law-series/">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>In <em>Koehler</em> v. <em>NetSpend Holdings Inc.</em>, the Delaware Court of Chancery found that the directors of NetSpend likely breached their <em>Revlon</em> duty to obtain the highest price reasonably available for stockholders by pursuing a single-bidder strategy for selling the company. The board’s lack of knowledge as to the company’s value and related failure to contact potentially interested parties set it apart from other single bidder cases such as <em>Plains Exploration</em>, a recent case where the court found a single-bidder sale process to be reasonable. Nevertheless, the Court declined to enjoin the merger because an injunction could risk the stockholders’ opportunity to receive a substantial premium over the market price for their shares.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/06/04/delaware-court-of-chancery-criticizes-boards-sale-process-3/#more-46379" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Delaware Court of Chancery Criticizes Board’s Sale Process">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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