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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Delaware Court Decision on Entire Fairness Review for Mergers &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Delaware Court Decision on Entire Fairness Review for Mergers</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/06/07/delaware-court-decision-on-entire-fairness-review-for-mergers/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=delaware-court-decision-on-entire-fairness-review-for-mergers</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/06/07/delaware-court-decision-on-entire-fairness-review-for-mergers/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 07 Jun 2013 13:30:42 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Boards of Directors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Court Cases]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mergers & Acquisitions]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Board independence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Business judgment rule]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Delaware cases]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Delaware law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fairness review]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Going private]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[In an important and thoughtful decision that will influence the structure of future going-private transactions by controlling stockholders, Chancellor Strine of the Delaware Court of Chancery applied the business judgment rule—instead of the more onerous entire fairness review—to a going-private merger by a controlling stockholder because the merger was structured to adequately protect minority stockholders. [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Kobi Kastiel, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Friday, June 7, 2013 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">The following post comes to us from <a href="http://www.paulweiss.com/professionals/partners-and-counsel/robert-b-schumer.aspx" target="_blank">Robert B. Schumer</a>, chair of the Corporate Department at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &amp; Garrison LLP, and is based on a Paul Weiss client memorandum. This post is part of the <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/the-delaware-law-series/">Delaware law</a> series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/the-delaware-law-series/">here</a>. Additional reading about <em>In re MFW Shareholders Litigation</em> is available <a href="http://reaction.willkie.com/rs/emsdocuments/Business_Judgement_Rule_Not_Entire_Fairness.pdf" target="_blank">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>In an important and thoughtful decision that will influence the structure of future going-private transactions by controlling stockholders, Chancellor Strine of the Delaware Court of Chancery applied the business judgment rule—instead of the more onerous entire fairness review—to a going-private merger by a controlling stockholder because the merger was structured to adequately protect minority stockholders. The decision is likely to be appealed, but if affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court on appeal, the case should provide certainty in an area of the law that has been a source of debate and uncertainty for two decades. The decision, <em>In re MFW Shareholders Litigation</em>, provides a detailed roadmap to obtaining the more favorable business judgment rule review and reducing the considerable litigation costs and risks associated with entire fairness review.</p>
<p>The court in <em>MFW</em> held that if the transaction is (1) negotiated by a fully-empowered special committee of directors who are independent of the controlling stockholder and (2) conditioned on the approval of a majority of the minority stockholders, then entire fairness review will not apply. The court noted the following key elements of the process:</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/06/07/delaware-court-decision-on-entire-fairness-review-for-mergers/#more-46680" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Delaware Court Decision on Entire Fairness Review for Mergers">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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