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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Lessons from the 2013 Proxy Season &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Lessons from the 2013 Proxy Season</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/06/12/lessons-from-the-2013-proxy-season/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=lessons-from-the-2013-proxy-season</link>
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		<pubDate>Wed, 12 Jun 2013 13:10:50 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Boards of Directors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate Elections & Voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Institutional Investors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy advisors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy materials]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy season]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder activism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder meetings]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[1. Shareholder activism is growing at an increasing rate. No company is too big to become the target of an activist, and even companies with sterling corporate governance practices and positive share price performance, including outperformance of peers, may be targeted. 2. “Activist Hedge Fund” has become an asset class in which institutional investors are [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Martin Lipton, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, on Wednesday, June 12, 2013 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.wlrk.com/mlipton" target="_blank">Martin Lipton</a> is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &amp; Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton, <a href="http://www.wlrk.com/KLCain/" target="_blank">Karessa L. Cain</a>, and <a href="http://www.wlrk.com/SVNiles/" target="_blank">Sabastian V. Niles</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p><strong>1.</strong> Shareholder activism is growing at an increasing rate. No company is too big to become the target of an activist, and even companies with sterling corporate governance practices and positive share price performance, including outperformance of peers, may be targeted.</p>
<p><strong>2.</strong> “Activist Hedge Fund” has become an asset class in which institutional investors are making substantial investments. In addition, even where institutional investors are not themselves limited partners in the activist hedge fund, several now maintain open and regular lines of communication with activists, including sharing potential “hit lists” of possible targets.</p>
<p><strong>3.</strong> Major investment banks, law firms, proxy solicitors, and public relations advisors are representing activists.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/06/12/lessons-from-the-2013-proxy-season/#more-47238" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Lessons from the 2013 Proxy Season">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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