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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>The Unintended Consequences of Say on Pay Votes &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>The Unintended Consequences of Say on Pay Votes</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/07/08/the-unintended-consequences-of-say-on-pay-votes/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=the-unintended-consequences-of-say-on-pay-votes</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/07/08/the-unintended-consequences-of-say-on-pay-votes/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 08 Jul 2013 13:35:41 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Corporate Elections & Voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Executive Compensation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Incentives]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ISS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pay Governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Performance measures]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Say on pay]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Editor’s Note: Ira Kay is a Managing Partner at Pay Governance LLC. This post is based on a Pay Governance memorandum by Mr. Kay and John Sinkular. The confluence of Say on Pay (SOP) votes and heightened scrutiny plus the influence of proxy advisory firms (particularly ISS) are having a major unintended consequence—the movement to [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="background: #F8F8F8;padding: 10px;margin-top: 5px;margin-bottom: 10px"><strong>Editor’s Note:</strong> <a href="http://paygovernance.com/author/iratkay/" target="_blank">Ira Kay</a> is a Managing Partner at Pay Governance LLC. This post is based on a Pay Governance memorandum by Mr. Kay and <a href="http://paygovernance.com/author/johnrsinkular/" target="_blank">John Sinkular</a>.</div>
<p>The confluence of Say on Pay (SOP) votes and heightened scrutiny plus the influence of proxy advisory firms (particularly ISS) are having a major unintended consequence—the movement to “one-size-fits-all” or homogenization of executive compensation programs. It is true that SOP votes have encouraged some valid governance enhancements, for example, significantly more shareholder outreach by many large companies. However, in order to minimize the potential for a negative SOP vote outcome, many companies are changing their pay practices based more on potential external views than business/talent needs. This is particularly apparent in the design of performance share plans with the increasing use of relative TSR (at nearly 50% prevalence). Below we summarize other areas of the executive compensation program that are exhibiting homogenization, the resulting risks and potential steps companies can take to preserve/maximize the linkage to a company’s business strategy and talent needs.</p>
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