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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Director Independence: Interplay Between Delaware Law and Exchange Rules &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Director Independence: Interplay Between Delaware Law and Exchange Rules</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/10/07/director-independence-interplay-between-delaware-law-and-exchange-rules/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=director-independence-interplay-between-delaware-law-and-exchange-rules</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 07 Oct 2013 13:17:58 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[The MFW decision that was issued earlier this year by the Chancellor of the Delaware Chancery Court has been the subject of much discussion with respect to transactions involving controlling shareholders. [1] But the decision also addressed another important topic: the interplay between the exchange rules and Delaware law with respect to director independence. MFW [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Noam Noked, co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Monday, October 7, 2013 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">The following post comes to us from <a href="http://www.kirkland.com/sitecontent.cfm?contentID=220&amp;itemID=8992" target="_blank">Jay P. Lefkowitz</a>, senior litigation partner and member of the Global Management Executive Committee at Kirkland &amp; Ellis LLP, and is based on a Kirkland publication by Mr. Lefkowitz, <a href="http://www.kirkland.com/sitecontent.cfm?contentid=220&amp;itemid=7815" target="_blank">Andrew B. Clubok</a>, <a href="http://www.kirkland.com/sitecontent.cfm?contentid=220&amp;itemid=7996" target="_blank">Yosef J. Riemer</a>, and <a href="http://www.kirkland.com/sitecontent.cfm?contentid=220&amp;itemid=8212" target="_blank">Matthew Solum</a>. This post is part of the <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/the-delaware-law-series/">Delaware law series</a>, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/the-delaware-law-series/">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>The <em>MFW</em> decision that was issued earlier this year by the Chancellor of the Delaware Chancery Court has been the subject of much discussion with respect to transactions involving controlling shareholders. <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/10/07/director-independence-interplay-between-delaware-law-and-exchange-rules/#1">[1]</a><a name="1b"></a> But the decision also addressed another important topic: the interplay between the exchange rules and Delaware law with respect to director independence. <em>MFW</em> seemed to align the Delaware law test for director independence with the specific, detailed independence requirements in the exchange rules, but Delaware decisions since <em>MFW</em> continue to reflect highly fact-intensive inquiries that look beyond the bright-line exchange rules. Accordingly, it is important to consider both the exchange rules and the latest guidance from Delaware courts when assessing director independence.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/10/07/director-independence-interplay-between-delaware-law-and-exchange-rules/#more-53524" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Director Independence: Interplay Between Delaware Law and Exchange Rules">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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