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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Boards Should Minimize the Role of Proxy Advisors &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Boards Should Minimize the Role of Proxy Advisors</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/10/31/boards-should-minimize-the-role-of-proxy-advisors/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=boards-should-minimize-the-role-of-proxy-advisors</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/10/31/boards-should-minimize-the-role-of-proxy-advisors/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 31 Oct 2013 13:15:33 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Boards of Directors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate Elections & Voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Institutional Investors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fiduciary duties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Glass Lewis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ISS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy advisors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder voting]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[The boards of public companies are increasingly being assessed by a hoard of short-term focused “activist” investors and an increasingly third-party-advised stockholder base that relies heavily on proxy advisory firms to make important voting decisions for them. It is estimated that over 75 percent of all shares of public companies are held in a managed [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by James Woolery, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, on Thursday, October 31, 2013 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.cadwalader.com/professionals/james-woolery" target="_blank">James Woolery</a> is Deputy Chairman of Cadwalader, Wickersham &amp; Taft LLP, Co-Chair of its Corporate Department and head of its Business Development Group. The following post is based on a Cadwalader publication by <a href="http://www.cadwalader.com/professionals/louis-j-bevilacqua" target="_blank">Louis J. Bevilacqua</a>, Co-Chair of the firm&#8217;s Corporate Department and the head of its Mergers &amp; Acquisitions and Securities Group.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>The boards of public companies are increasingly being assessed by a hoard of short-term focused “activist” investors and an increasingly third-party-advised stockholder base that relies heavily on proxy advisory firms to make important voting decisions for them. It is estimated that over 75 percent of all shares of public companies are held in a managed fund or institutional account.</p>
<p>Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis control 97 percent of the market for proxy advice; and the two dominant proxy advisors reportedly affect 38 percent of votes cast at U.S. public company shareholder meetings. Their dominance in the proxy marketplace not only affects numerous votes but, more importantly, how companies manage and deal with their shareholders. Both firms wield enormous influence without having “skin in the game.” Perhaps even more concerning, given the influence they have on public companies, the proxy advisors (i) are understaffed and therefore establish generic voting recommendations and (ii) profit from engaging in activities involving material conflicts of interest, including marketing their advisory services to many of the same companies for which they provide proxy recommendations. In addition, Glass Lewis is owned by an activist fund with an agenda.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/10/31/boards-should-minimize-the-role-of-proxy-advisors/#more-54217" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Boards Should Minimize the Role of Proxy Advisors">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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