<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
	<atom:link href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/11/29/some-thoughts-for-boards-of-directors-in-2014/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu</link>
	<description>The leading online blog in the fields of corporate governance and financial regulation.</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Sun, 13 Sep 2026 11:30:32 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-US</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=6.5.10</generator>

 
	<item>
		<title>Some Thoughts for Boards of Directors in 2014</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/11/29/some-thoughts-for-boards-of-directors-in-2014/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=some-thoughts-for-boards-of-directors-in-2014</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/11/29/some-thoughts-for-boards-of-directors-in-2014/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 Nov 2013 14:55:26 +0000</pubDate>
<!-- 		<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator> -->
				<category><![CDATA[Boards of Directors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Executive Compensation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Board composition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Board monitoring]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Board turnover]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Diversity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ISS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy advisors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Risk management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder activism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder communications]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/?p=56055?d=20141202161258EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In many respects, the relentless drive to adopt corporate governance mandates seems to have reached a plateau: essentially all of the prescribed “best practices”—including say-on-pay, the dismantling of takeover defenses, majority voting in the election of directors and the declassification of board structures—have been codified in rules and regulations or voluntarily adopted by a majority [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Martin Lipton, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, on Friday, November 29, 2013 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.wlrk.com/mlipton" target="_blank">Martin Lipton</a> is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &amp; Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. The following post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton, <a href="http://www.wlrk.com/sarosenblum/" target="_blank">Steven A. Rosenblum</a>, and <a href="http://www.wlrk.com/klcain/" target="_blank">Karessa L. Cain</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>In many respects, the relentless drive to adopt corporate governance mandates seems to have reached a plateau: essentially all of the prescribed “best practices”—including say-on-pay, the dismantling of takeover defenses, majority voting in the election of directors and the declassification of board structures—have been codified in rules and regulations or voluntarily adopted by a majority of S&amp;P 500 companies. Only 11 percent of S&amp;P 500 companies have a classified board, 8 percent have a poison pill and 6 percent have not adopted a majority vote or plurality-vote-plus-resignation standard to elect directors. The activists’ “best practices” of yesterday have become the standard practices of today. While proxy advisors and other stakeholders in the corporate governance industry will undoubtedly continue to propose new mandates, we are currently in a period of relative stasis as compared to the sea change that began with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and unfolded over the last decade.</p>
<p>In other respects, however, the corporate governance landscape continues to evolve in meaningful ways. We may be entering an era of more nuanced corporate governance debates, where the focus has shifted from check-the-box policies to more complex questions such as how to strike the right balance in recruiting directors with complementary skill sets and diverse perspectives, and how to tailor the board’s role in overseeing risk management to the specific needs of the company. Shareholder engagement has been an area of particular focus, as both companies and institutional investors have sought to engage in more regular dialogue on corporate governance matters. The evolving trend here is not only the frequency and depth of engagement, but also a more fundamental re-thinking of the nature of relationships with shareholders and the role that these relationships play in facilitating long-term value creation. Importantly, this trend is about more than just expanding shareholder influence in corporate governance matters; instead, there is an emphasis on the roles and responsibilities of both companies and shareholders in facilitating thoughtful conversations instead of reflexive, off-the-shelf mandates on corporate governance issues, and cultivating long-term relationships that have the potential to curb short-termist pressures in the market.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/11/29/some-thoughts-for-boards-of-directors-in-2014/#more-56055" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Some Thoughts for Boards of Directors in 2014">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/11/29/some-thoughts-for-boards-of-directors-in-2014/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
		</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
