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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>SEC&#8217;s Non-Decision Decision on Corporate Political Activity a Policy and Political Mistake &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>SEC&#8217;s Non-Decision Decision on Corporate Political Activity a Policy and Political Mistake</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/12/13/secs-non-decision-decision-on-corporate-political-activity-a-policy-and-political-mistake/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=secs-non-decision-decision-on-corporate-political-activity-a-policy-and-political-mistake</link>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Dec 2013 13:51:49 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[The SEC’s recent decision to take disclosure of political activities off the SEC’s agenda is a policy mistake, as it ignores the best research on the point, described below, and perpetuates a key loophole in the investor-relevant disclosure rules, allowing large companies to omit material information about the politically inflected risks they run with other [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by John Coates, Harvard Law School, on Friday, December 13, 2013 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/index.html?id=11" target="_blank" rel="noopener">John Coates</a> is the John F. Cogan, Jr. Professor of Law and Economics at Harvard Law School. His empirical work on corporate political spending includes <a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=1881883" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Corporate Governance and Corporate Political Activity: What Effect Will Citizens United Have on Shareholder Wealth?</a>, <a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=1923804" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Fulfilling Kennedy’s Promise: Why the SEC Should Mandate Disclosure of Corporate Political Activity</a> (with Taylor Lincoln), and <a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=2172638" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Corporate Politics, Governance, and Value Before and after Citizens United</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>The SEC’s recent decision to take disclosure of political activities off the SEC’s agenda is a policy mistake, as it ignores the best research on the point, described below, and perpetuates a key loophole in the investor-relevant disclosure rules, allowing large companies to omit material information about the politically inflected risks they run with other people’s money. It is also a political mistake, as it repudiates the 600,000+ investors who have written to the SEC personally to ask it to adopt a rule requiring such disclosure, and will let entrenched business interests focus their lobbying solely on watering down regulation mandated under the Dodd-Frank Act and the 2012 securities law statute, rather than having also to work to influence a disclosure regime.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/12/13/secs-non-decision-decision-on-corporate-political-activity-a-policy-and-political-mistake/#more-56636" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading SEC&#8217;s Non-Decision Decision on Corporate Political Activity a Policy and Political Mistake">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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