<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
	<atom:link href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/04/30/2014-proxy-season-early-indications/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu</link>
	<description>The leading online blog in the fields of corporate governance and financial regulation.</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 13:31:56 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-US</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=6.5.8</generator>

 
	<item>
		<title>2014 Proxy Season: Early Indications</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/04/30/2014-proxy-season-early-indications/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=2014-proxy-season-early-indications</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/04/30/2014-proxy-season-early-indications/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 30 Apr 2014 13:04:36 +0000</pubDate>
<!-- 		<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator> -->
				<category><![CDATA[Boards of Directors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate Elections & Voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Institutional Investors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Engagement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy season]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Say on pay]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SEC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder activism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder voting]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/?p=62885?d=20141202130814EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[It is still early days, but here is what we are seeing as the 2014 proxy season unfolds: Institutional investors promote governance reforms and engagement efforts. Prior to the season Vanguard sent letters to S&#38;P 500 companies seeking adoption of annual director elections, majority voting and the right of holders of 25% of the common [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Richard J. Sandler, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, on Wednesday, April 30, 2014 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.davispolk.com/lawyers/richard-sandler/" target="_blank">Richard J. Sandler</a> is a partner at Davis Polk &amp; Wardwell LLP and co-head of the firm’s global corporate governance group. This post is based on a Davis Polk client memorandum.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>It is still early days, but here is what we are seeing as the 2014 proxy season unfolds:</p>
<p><strong>Institutional investors promote governance reforms and engagement efforts</strong>. Prior to the season Vanguard sent letters to S&amp;P 500 companies seeking adoption of annual director elections, majority voting and the right of holders of 25% of the common stock to call special meetings. It was an unusually public move for a large institutional investor that, like others of its kind, tends to engage in quiet diplomacy. Also unusual was the call for universal adoption of this set of governance practices, in contrast to the case-by-case approach traditionally taken by institutional investors. It may signal that, at least on the governance side of these institutions, these practices are now viewed more as accepted norms than as just best practices. But there remains a disconnect between the governance and investment sides, as we continue to see institutional investors participate in IPOs for companies with none of these provisions.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/04/30/2014-proxy-season-early-indications/#more-62885" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading 2014 Proxy Season: Early Indications">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/04/30/2014-proxy-season-early-indications/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
		</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
