The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu The leading online blog in the fields of corporate governance and financial regulation. Fri, 08 May 2026 11:32:19 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.5.8 https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/cropped-photography-4-e1706898544564-1-32x32.png Executive Gatekeepers: Useful and Divertible Governance? – The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu 32 32 Executive Gatekeepers: Useful and Divertible Governance? https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/09/30/executive-gatekeepers-useful-and-divertible-governance/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=executive-gatekeepers-useful-and-divertible-governance https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/09/30/executive-gatekeepers-useful-and-divertible-governance/#comments Tue, 30 Sep 2014 13:00:34 +0000 http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/?p=65909?d=20141215142033EST Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Tuesday, September 30, 2014
Editor's Note:

The following post comes to us from Adair Morse of the Finance Group at the University of California, Berkeley; and Wei Wang and Serena Wu, both of Queen’s School of Business, Canada.

In our paper, Executive Gatekeepers: Useful and Divertible Governance?, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we study the role of executive gatekeepers in preventing governance failures, and the counter-incentive effects created by equity compensation. Specifically, we examine the following two questions. First, do executive gatekeepers actually improve governance in the average firm? Second, does the effectiveness of gatekeepers in ensuring compliance and/or reducing corporate misconduct depend on their incentive contracts?

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