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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Towards a &#8220;Rule of Law&#8221; Approach to Restructuring Sovereign Debt &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Towards a &#8220;Rule of Law&#8221; Approach to Restructuring Sovereign Debt</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/10/14/towards-a-rule-of-law-approach-to-restructuring-sovereign-debt/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=towards-a-rule-of-law-approach-to-restructuring-sovereign-debt</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 14 Oct 2014 13:08:49 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bankruptcy & Financial Distress]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Financial Crisis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International Corporate Governance & Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bailouts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Debt]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Financial crisis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Moral hazard]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Reorganizations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Restructurings]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sovereign debt]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Too big to fail]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[In a landmark vote, the United Nations General Assembly overwhelmingly decided on September 9 to begin work on a multilateral legal framework—effectively a treaty or convention—for sovereign debt restructuring, in order to improve the global financial system. The resolution was introduced by Bolivia on behalf of the “Group of 77” developing nations and China. In [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Steven L. Schwarcz, Duke University, on Tuesday, October 14, 2014 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://law.duke.edu/fac/schwarcz/" target="_blank">Steven L. Schwarcz</a> is the Stanley A. Star Professor of Law &amp; Business at Duke University School of Law.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>In a landmark vote, the United Nations General Assembly overwhelmingly decided on September 9 to begin work on a multilateral legal framework—effectively a treaty or convention—for sovereign debt restructuring, in order to improve the global financial system. The resolution was introduced by Bolivia on behalf of the “Group of 77” developing nations and China. In part, it was sparked by recent litigation in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that, to comply with a <em>pari passu</em> clause (imposing an equal-and-ratable repayment obligation), Argentina could not pay holders of exchanged bonds without also paying holdouts who retained the original bonds. That decision was all the more dramatic because the holdouts included hedge funds—sometimes characterized as “vulture funds”—that purchased the original bonds at a deep discount, yet sued for full payment.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/10/14/towards-a-rule-of-law-approach-to-restructuring-sovereign-debt/#more-66088" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Towards a &#8220;Rule of Law&#8221; Approach to Restructuring Sovereign Debt">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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