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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Shareholder Returns of Hostile Takeover Targets &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Shareholder Returns of Hostile Takeover Targets</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/10/24/shareholder-returns-of-hostile-takeover-targets/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=shareholder-returns-of-hostile-takeover-targets</link>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 24 Oct 2014 13:00:31 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Corporate Elections & Voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mergers & Acquisitions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hostile takeover]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ISS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mergers & acquisitions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy fights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Stock returns]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[This morning [October 22, 2014], Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) issued a note to clients entitled “The IRR of ‘No’.” The note argues that shareholders of companies that have resisted hostile takeover bids all the way through a proxy fight at a shareholder meeting have incurred “profoundly negative” returns following those shareholder meetings, compared to alternative [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Sabastian V. Niles, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, on Friday, October 24, 2014 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.wlrk.com/SVNiles/" target="_blank">Sabastian V. Niles</a> is counsel in the Corporate Department at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &amp; Katz, where he focuses on rapid response shareholder activism, takeover defense and corporate governance. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton firm memorandum by Mr. Niles and <a href="http://w3.wlrk.com/ESRobinson/" target="_blank">Eric S. Robinson</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>This morning [October 22, 2014], Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) issued a note to clients entitled “The IRR of ‘No’.” The note argues that shareholders of companies that have resisted hostile takeover bids all the way through a proxy fight at a shareholder meeting have incurred “profoundly negative” returns following those shareholder meetings, compared to alternative investments. ISS identified seven cases in the last five years where bidders have pursued a combined takeover bid and proxy fight through a target shareholder meeting, and measured the mean and median total shareholder returns from the dates of the contested shareholder meeting through October 20, 2014, compared to target shareholders having sold at the closing price the day before the contested meeting and reinvesting in the S&amp;P 500 index or a peer group.</p>
<p>A close look at the ISS report shows that it has at least two critical methodological and analytical flaws that completely undermine its conclusions:</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/10/24/shareholder-returns-of-hostile-takeover-targets/#more-66423" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Shareholder Returns of Hostile Takeover Targets">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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