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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>How United States v. Newman Changes The Law &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>How United States v. Newman Changes The Law</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/05/03/how-united-states-v-newman-changes-the-law/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=how-united-states-v-newman-changes-the-law</link>
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		<pubDate>Sun, 03 May 2015 13:00:49 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[In unsuccessfully seeking rehearing in United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), reh’g denied, Nos. 13-1837, 13-1917 (2d Cir. Apr. 3, 2015), the Government acknowledged that the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Newman “will dramatically limit the Government’s ability to prosecute some of the most common, culpable, and market-threatening forms of insider [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Jon Eisenberg, K&L Gates LLP, on Sunday, May 3, 2015 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.klgates.com/jon-n-eisenberg/" target="_blank">Jon N. Eisenberg</a> is partner in the Government Enforcement practice at K&amp;L Gates LLP. This post is based on a K&amp;L Gates publication by Mr. Eisenberg. The complete publication, including footnotes, is available <a href="http://www.klgates.com/friends-who-trade-on-inside-information-how-united-states-v-newman-changes-the-law-04-20-2015/" target="_blank">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>In unsuccessfully seeking rehearing in <em>United States v. Newman,</em> 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), <em>reh’g denied</em>, Nos. 13-1837, 13-1917 (2d Cir. Apr. 3, 2015), the Government acknowledged that the Second Circuit’s recent decision in <em>Newman</em> “will dramatically limit the Government’s ability to prosecute some of the most common, culpable, and market-threatening forms of insider trading,” and “arguably represents one of the most significant developments in insider trading law in a generation.” As we discuss below, <em>Newman</em> is a well-deserved generational setback for the Government. It reflects the Second Circuit’s reasonable reaction to Government overreach, and it establishes brighter lines to cabin prosecutorial and SEC discretion in bringing future criminal and civil insider trading actions.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/05/03/how-united-states-v-newman-changes-the-law/#more-70772" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading How United States v. Newman Changes The Law">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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