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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>The Trend Towards Board Term Limits is Based on Faulty Logic &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>The Trend Towards Board Term Limits is Based on Faulty Logic</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/06/01/the-trend-towards-board-term-limits-is-based-on-faulty-logic/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=the-trend-towards-board-term-limits-is-based-on-faulty-logic</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2015 16:13:34 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Boards of Directors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Board composition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Board dynamics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Board independence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Board turnover]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Entrenchment]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[In the business world, experience is generally considered to be positive. When it comes to corporate directors, however, tenure is increasingly viewed with suspicion. Yet the trend towards board term limits is based on faulty logic and threatens performance. The movement towards director term limits is global. In France, directors are not considered independent if [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Robert C. Pozen, Harvard Business School, on Monday, June 1, 2015 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://bobpozen.com/" target="_blank">Robert Pozen</a> is a senior lecturer at Harvard Business School and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. This post is based on an article by Mr. Pozen and Theresa Hamacher that originally appeared in the <em>Financial Times</em>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>In the business world, experience is generally considered to be positive. When it comes to corporate directors, however, tenure is increasingly viewed with suspicion. Yet the trend towards board term limits is based on faulty logic and threatens performance.</p>
<p>The movement towards director term limits is global. In France, directors are not considered independent if they have served on the company’s board for more than 12 years. In the UK, publicly traded companies must either comply or explain: terminate a director after nine years of service, or explain why long tenure has not compromised director independence.</p>
<p>In the US, the Council of Institutional Investors, which represents many public pension funds, urges its members to consider length of tenure when voting on directors at corporate elections. The council is concerned that directors become too friendly with management if they serve for extended periods.</p>
<p>Institutional Shareholder Services, the proxy voting advisory firm that is a powerful force in corporate governance, penalises companies with long-serving directors by reducing their “quick score” governance rating. Under the current methodology, a company loses points if a substantial proportion of its directors has served for more than nine years. Although ISS recognises that there are divergent views on this, it concluded that “directors who have sat on one board in conjunction with the same management team may reasonably be expected to support that management team’s decisions more willingly”.</p>
<p>But the assumption that lengthy director service means cozy relationships with management simply is not supported by the facts.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/06/01/the-trend-towards-board-term-limits-is-based-on-faulty-logic/#more-70923" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading The Trend Towards Board Term Limits is Based on Faulty Logic">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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