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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Risk Management and the Board of Directors &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Risk Management and the Board of Directors</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/07/28/risk-management-and-the-board-of-directors-3/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=risk-management-and-the-board-of-directors-3</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 28 Jul 2015 15:42:28 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Boards of Directors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate culture]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Risk committee]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Risk management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Risk oversight]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities regulation]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Introduction Overview Corporate risk taking and the monitoring of risks have continued to remain front and center in the minds of boards of directors, legislators and the media, fueled by the powerful mix of continuing worldwide financial instability; ever-increasing regulation; anger and resentment at the alleged power of business and financial executives and boards, including [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Martin Lipton, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, on Tuesday, July 28, 2015 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.wlrk.com/mlipton" target="_blank">Martin Lipton</a> is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &amp; Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton, <a href="http://www.wlrk.com/DANeff/" target="_blank">Daniel A. Neff</a>, <a href="http://www.wlrk.com/ARBrownstein/" target="_blank">Andrew R. Brownstein</a>, <a href="http://www.wlrk.com/SARosenblum/" target="_blank">Steven A. Rosenblum</a>, and <a href="http://www.wlrk.com/AOEmmerich/" target="_blank">Adam O. Emmerich</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><h2>Introduction</h2>
<h3>Overview</h3>
<p>Corporate risk taking and the monitoring of risks have continued to remain front and center in the minds of boards of directors, legislators and the media, fueled by the powerful mix of continuing worldwide financial instability; ever-increasing regulation; anger and resentment at the alleged power of business and financial executives and boards, including particularly as to compensation during times of economic uncertainty, retrenchment, contraction, and changing dynamics between U.S., European, Asian and emerging market economies; and consistent media attention to corporations and economies in crisis. The reputational damage to companies and their boards that fail to properly manage risk is a major threat, and Institutional Shareholder Services now includes specific reference to risk oversight as part of its criteria for choosing when to recommend withhold votes in uncontested director elections. This focus on the board’s role in risk management has also led to increased public and governmental scrutiny of compensation arrangements and the board’s relationship to excessive risk taking and has brought added emphasis to the relationship between executive compensation and effective risk management. This post highlights a number of issues that have remained critical over the years and provides an update to reflect emerging and recent developments.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/07/28/risk-management-and-the-board-of-directors-3/#more-71242" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Risk Management and the Board of Directors">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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