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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>The Limits of Using TSR as an Incentive Measure &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>The Limits of Using TSR as an Incentive Measure</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/10/13/the-limits-of-using-tsr-as-an-incentive-measure/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=the-limits-of-using-tsr-as-an-incentive-measure</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2015 14:37:08 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=71760?d=20151013112827EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The widespread and growing use of total shareholder return (TSR) as an incentive measure is not the panacea many believe it to be. To test our point of view we wanted to explore one critical question: Does the inclusion of TSR measures in long-term incentive plans result in improved firm performance? To find out the [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by David N. Swinford, Pearl Meyer & Partners, LLC, on Tuesday, October 13, 2015 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.pearlmeyer.com/swinford" target="_blank">David N. Swinford</a> is the President and Chief Executive Officer of Pearl Meyer &amp; Partners, LLC. This post relates to research conducted by Pearl Meyer and the Cornell University ILR School’s Institute for Compensation Studies.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>The widespread and growing use of total shareholder return (TSR) as an incentive measure is not the panacea many believe it to be. To test our point of view we wanted to explore one critical question: <em>Does the inclusion of TSR measures in long-term incentive plans result in improved firm performance?</em></p>
<p>To find out the answer, Pearl Meyer collaborated with the Cornell University ILR School’s Institute for Compensation Studies to conduct original research on the use of TSR by S&amp;P 500 companies over a ten year period.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/10/13/the-limits-of-using-tsr-as-an-incentive-measure/#more-71760" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading The Limits of Using TSR as an Incentive Measure">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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