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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Director Removal Without Cause &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Director Removal Without Cause</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/01/08/director-removal-without-cause/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=director-removal-without-cause</link>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 08 Jan 2016 14:28:37 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=72257?d=20160108092837EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In a recent bench ruling on a summary judgment motion in a case involving Vaalco Energy, Vice Chancellor Laster held that a provision of a company’s charter or bylaws could not override the default rule under Delaware law that directors serving on a non-classified board (i.e., annually elected) may be removed with or without cause [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Daniel E. Wolf, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, on Friday, January 8, 2016 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.kirkland.com/sitecontent.cfm?contentID=220&amp;itemID=9713" target="_blank">Daniel Wolf</a> is a partner focusing on mergers and acquisitions at Kirkland &amp; Ellis LLP. The following post is based on a Kirkland memorandum by Mr. Wolf and <a href="http://www.kirkland.com/sitecontent.cfm?contentID=220&amp;itemID=8212" target="_blank">Matthew Solum</a>. This post is part of the <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">Delaware law series</a>; links to other posts in the series are available <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>In a recent bench ruling on a summary judgment motion in a case involving Vaalco Energy, Vice Chancellor Laster held that a provision of a company’s charter or bylaws could not override the default rule under Delaware law that directors serving on a non-classified board (i.e., annually elected) may be removed with or <em>without</em> cause by vote of holders of a majority of the outstanding shares entitled to vote in director elections. While prior Chancery rulings, including Nycal and Rohe, reached largely similar conclusions in related circumstances, VC Laster’s decision in Vaalco clearly articulates his view that this type of charter or bylaw provision that purports to limit director removal for non-classified boards to cases of cause is simply invalid as a matter of Delaware law.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/01/08/director-removal-without-cause/#more-72257" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Director Removal Without Cause">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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