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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Failure-of-Oversight Claims Against Directors &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Failure-of-Oversight Claims Against Directors</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/01/15/failure-of-oversight-claims-against-directors/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=failure-of-oversight-claims-against-directors</link>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 15 Jan 2016 14:16:23 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=72334?d=20160115091623EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Last week, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of purported shareholder derivative claims alleging that directors of JPMorgan Chase, a Delaware corporation, failed to institute internal controls sufficient to detect Bernard Madoff&#8217;s Ponzi scheme. Central Laborers v. Dimon, No. 14-4516 (2d Cir. Jan. 6, 2016) (summary order). The decision represents [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by John F. Savarese, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, on Friday, January 15, 2016 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://w3.wlrk.com/jfsavarese/" target="_blank">John F. Savarese</a> is a partner in the Litigation Department of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &amp; Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton firm memorandum by Mr. Savarese, <a href="http://w3.wlrk.com/EAKleinhaus/" target="_blank">Emil A. Kleinhaus</a>, <a href="http://w3.wlrk.com/clwilson/" target="_blank">C. Lee Wilson</a>, and <a href="http://w3.wlrk.com/noah-b-yavitz/" target="_blank">Noah B. Yavitz</a>. This post is part of the <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">Delaware law series</a>; links to other posts in the series are available <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>Last week, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of purported shareholder derivative claims alleging that directors of JPMorgan Chase, a Delaware corporation, failed to institute internal controls sufficient to detect Bernard Madoff&#8217;s Ponzi scheme. <a href="http://www.wlrk.com/docs/CentralLaborers.pdf" target="_blank"><em>Central Laborers v. Dimon</em>, No. 14-4516 (2d Cir. Jan. 6, 2016) (summary order)</a>. The decision represents a forceful application of Delaware law holding that, when directors are protected by standard exculpation provisions in the corporate charter, they will not be liable for alleged oversight failures absent a particularized showing of bad-faith misconduct.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/01/15/failure-of-oversight-claims-against-directors/#more-72334" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Failure-of-Oversight Claims Against Directors">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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