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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>The Board-Centric Annual Meeting &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>The Board-Centric Annual Meeting</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/02/09/the-board-centric-annual-meeting/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=the-board-centric-annual-meeting</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/02/09/the-board-centric-annual-meeting/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 09 Feb 2016 14:27:55 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=72418?d=20160209092755EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[For a growing number of listed companies around the world the annual shareholder meeting has come to resemble a trial by ordeal. Instead of the traditional town-meeting business forum, the AGM has morphed into a jousting field where activists, proxy advisors and various special interest groups play a dominant role. This state of affairs has [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by John C. Wilcox, Sodali, on Tuesday, February 9, 2016 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.sodali.com/about-us/board-members-and-team" target="_blank">John Wilcox</a> is Chairman of Sodali and former Head of Corporate Governance at TIAA-CREF. This post is based on a Sodali publication by Mr. Wilcox.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>For a growing number of listed companies around the world the annual shareholder meeting has come to resemble a trial by ordeal. Instead of the traditional town-meeting business forum, the AGM has morphed into a jousting field where activists, proxy advisors and various special interest groups play a dominant role. This state of affairs has evolved because for the past three decades companies have been resistant to change and defensive about governance reform, while shareholders and activists have taken the lead in successfully promoting greater board accountability and stronger governance rules. Corporate scandals, the financial crisis, escalating CEO pay, declining public trust in business leaders together with enhanced shareholder rights have transformed the annual meeting into an event where companies often focus on damage control rather than showcasing their business.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/02/09/the-board-centric-annual-meeting/#more-72418" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading The Board-Centric Annual Meeting">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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