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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Anti-Activist Poison Pills &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Anti-Activist Poison Pills</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/22/anti-activist-poison-pills/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=anti-activist-poison-pills</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/22/anti-activist-poison-pills/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 22 Mar 2017 13:30:09 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Boards of Directors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Comparative Corporate Governance & Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate Elections & Voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Delaware law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hedge funds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Poison pills]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy access]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy contests]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder activism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder elections]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Short-termism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Takeover defenses]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Hedge funds have become active in corporate governance. They push for changes in strategy, including making very specific proposals, and sometimes seek (and secure) board representation. They do this by buying shares, conducting public campaigns, lobbying managers and other shareholders, and sometimes running a proxy contest. In response, boards of directors have adopted a variety [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock, NYU School of Law, on Wednesday, March 22, 2017 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/index.cfm?fuseaction=profile.overview&amp;personid=20029">Marcel Kahan</a> is George T. Lowy Professor of Law at NYU School of Law and <a href="https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/index.cfm?fuseaction=profile.overview&amp;personid=35610">Edward B. Rock</a> is Professor of Law at NYU School of Law. This post is based on a recent <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2928883">paper</a> by Professor Kahan and Professor Rock. This post is part of the <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">Delaware law series</a>; links to other posts in the series are available <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">here</a>. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <a class="external" href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=1884226" target="_blank" rel="nofollow">The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure</a> by Lucian Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson Jr. (discussed on the Forum <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/06/27/should-the-sec-tighten-its-13d-rules/">here</a>), and <a class="external" href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=2258083" target="_blank" rel="nofollow">Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy</a> by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Robert J. Jackson Jr., and Wei Jiang.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>Hedge funds have become active in corporate governance. They push for changes in strategy, including making very specific proposals, and sometimes seek (and secure) board representation. They do this by buying shares, conducting public campaigns, lobbying managers and other shareholders, and sometimes running a proxy contest. In response, boards of directors have adopted a variety of “defensive measures” including deploying the “poison pill” shareholder rights plan against activists.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/22/anti-activist-poison-pills/#more-80994" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Anti-Activist Poison Pills">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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