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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>The Deregulation of Private Capital and the Decline of the Public Company &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>The Deregulation of Private Capital and the Decline of the Public Company</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/04/27/the-deregulation-of-private-capital-and-the-decline-of-the-public-company/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=the-deregulation-of-private-capital-and-the-decline-of-the-public-company</link>
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		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Apr 2017 13:22:36 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Accounting & Disclosure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Capital formation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Capital markets]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Deregulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Disclosure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[External financing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Firm valuation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Information asymmetries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Information environment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IPOs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Private firms]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Public firms]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sarbanes–Oxley Act]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities regulation]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Despite attracting little notice until recently, the proportion of companies choosing to go public in the U.S. has been plummeting for more than two decades. Why is this happening? Most observers blame public companies’ increasing regulatory costs—particularly disclosure costs. Yet rising costs cannot be the full story, given that the downward trend began well before [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Elisabeth de Fontenay, Duke University School of Law, on Thursday, April 27, 2017 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a class="external" href="http://law.duke.edu/fac/defontenay/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow">Elisabeth de Fontenay</a> is an Associate Professor at Duke University School of Law. This post is based on a recent <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2951158">article</a> authored by Professor de Fontenay.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>Despite attracting little notice until recently, the proportion of companies choosing to go public in the U.S. has been plummeting for more than two decades. Why is this happening? Most observers blame public companies’ increasing regulatory costs—particularly disclosure costs. Yet rising costs cannot be the full story, given that the downward trend began well before Sarbanes-Oxley, the supposed game-changer for public-company regulation. In a recent article, <a href="https://ssrn.com/abstract=2951158">The Deregulation of Private Capital and the Decline of the Public Company</a>, I argue that the culprit need not be rising <em>costs</em> of corporate disclosure, but declining <em>benefits</em>.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/04/27/the-deregulation-of-private-capital-and-the-decline-of-the-public-company/#more-85931" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading The Deregulation of Private Capital and the Decline of the Public Company">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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