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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>The Value of the Shareholder Proposal Process &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>The Value of the Shareholder Proposal Process</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/07/11/the-value-of-the-shareholder-proposal-process/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=the-value-of-the-shareholder-proposal-process</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 11 Jul 2017 13:13:59 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Boards of Directors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate Elections & Voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Institutional Investors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legislative & Regulatory Developments]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[CHOICE Act]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder proposals]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder voting]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=97066?d=20230208110702EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Early in June, the House of Representatives passed a piece of legislation, dubbed the Financial CHOICE Act, which would gut much of Dodd-Frank. One of its provisions would make it impossible for all but the largest investors to file shareholder proposals by requiring that investors must hold at least one percent of the outstanding shares [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Julie Fox Gorte, Pax World Management, and Tim Smith, Walden Asset Management, on Tuesday, July 11, 2017 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">Julie Gorte, Ph.D., is Senior Vice President for Sustainable Investing at Pax World Management; Tim Smith is Director of ESG Shareowner Engagement at Walden Asset Management. Additional posts on the CHOICE Act are available <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/choice-act/">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>Early in June, the House of Representatives passed a piece of legislation, dubbed the Financial CHOICE Act, which would gut much of Dodd-Frank. One of its provisions would make it impossible for all but the largest investors to file shareholder proposals by requiring that investors must hold at least one percent of the outstanding shares for three years in order to file a proposal. This would remove a key tool that investors use to communicate with corporate boards.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/07/11/the-value-of-the-shareholder-proposal-process/#more-97066" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading The Value of the Shareholder Proposal Process">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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