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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Network Effects in Corporate Governance &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Network Effects in Corporate Governance</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/01/17/network-effects-in-corporate-governance/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=network-effects-in-corporate-governance</link>
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		<pubDate>Wed, 17 Jan 2018 14:02:34 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[Why Does Everyone Incorporate in Delaware? There are two canonical explanations: (1) Legal quality. Firms are influenced by the intrinsic qualities of Delaware’s legal system. By some reasonable measure, its statutes, common law, and expert courts are “the best.” (2) Network effects. Firms are influenced by each other’s corporate governance decisions. Why? Perhaps they interpret [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Sarath Sanga (Northwestern University), on Wednesday, January 17, 2018 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.law.northwestern.edu/faculty/profiles/SarathSanga/">Sarath Sanga</a> is Assistant Professor of Law at the Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law. This post is based on his recent <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3086245">paper</a> and is part of the <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">Delaware law series</a>; links to other posts in the series are available <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">here</a>. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <a class="external" href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=304386" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate</a> by Lucian Bebchuk and Alma Cohen; <a class="external" href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=275452" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">The Market for Corporate Law</a> by Lucian Bebchuk, Oren Bar-Gill and Michal Barzuza; and <a class="external" href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2117967" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Delaware Law as Lingua Franca: Evidence from VC-Backed Startups</a> by Jesse Fried, Brian J. Broughman, and Darian M. Ibrahim (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/01/08/delaware-law-as-lingua-franca-evidence-from-vc-backed-startups/">here</a>).</p>
</div></hgroup><h2>Why Does Everyone Incorporate in Delaware?</h2>
<p>There are two canonical explanations:</p>
<p><strong>(1) Legal quality.</strong> Firms are influenced by the intrinsic qualities of Delaware’s legal system. By some reasonable measure, its statutes, common law, and expert courts are “the best.”</p>
<p><strong>(2) Network effects.</strong> Firms are influenced by each other’s corporate governance decisions. Why? Perhaps they interpret these decisions as proof of Delaware’s quality. Or perhaps they only want to follow the trend. In either case, this is a self-perpetuating rationale: Everyone goes to Delaware because everyone else is already there.</p>
<p>In a new <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3086245">paper</a>, I analyze the incorporation histories of over 22,000 public companies from 1930 to 2010. I show that network effects were the principal force behind Delaware’s ascendance.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/01/17/network-effects-in-corporate-governance/#more-104194" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Network Effects in Corporate Governance">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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