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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>The Misuse of Tobin&#8217;s Q &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>The Misuse of Tobin&#8217;s Q</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/03/02/the-misuse-of-tobins-q/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=the-misuse-of-tobins-q</link>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 02 Mar 2018 14:09:58 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Comparative Corporate Governance & Regulation]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Accounting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Books and records]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Firm performance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Firm valuation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Long-Term value]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=105140?d=20180302090958EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In our paper, The Misuse of Tobin’s Q, which we recently posted to the Social Science Research Network, we examine the common and growing misuse of Tobin’s q as a proxy for firm value within the law and finance literatures. For several decades, Tobin’s q has been one of the most important concepts in business [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Robert Bartlett (UC Berkeley School of Law) and Frank Partnoy (University of San Diego School of Law), on Friday, March 2, 2018 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.law.berkeley.edu/our-faculty/faculty-profiles/robert-bartlett/">Robert Bartlett</a> is Professor of Law at UC Berkeley School of Law and <a href="http://frankpartnoy.com/about/">Frank Partnoy</a> is George E. Barrett Professor of Law and Finance at University of San Diego School of Law. This post is based on their recent <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3118020">paper</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>In our paper, <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3118020">The Misuse of Tobin’s <em>Q</em></a>, which we recently posted to the Social Science Research Network, we examine the common and growing misuse of Tobin’s <em>q</em> as a proxy for firm value within the law and finance literatures.</p>
<p>For several decades, Tobin’s <em>q </em>has been one of the most important concepts in business law and policy for examining how various regulatory and corporate governance provisions affect firm value, and therefore economic welfare. More than three hundred law review articles, including many of the most widely-cited in corporate and securities law, have referenced Tobin’s <em>q</em> as a proxy for firm value, as have hundreds of articles in the most highly-regarded peer-reviewed finance and economics journals<em>. </em>The trend in citations to Tobin’s <em>q</em> is markedly upward, and in 2017 alone, articles in leading law reviews referenced Tobin’s <em>q</em> as a proxy for firm value in analyzing such important topics as how firm value was affected by hedge fund activism, fiduciary duties, staggered boards, and corporate governance.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/03/02/the-misuse-of-tobins-q/#more-105140" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading The Misuse of Tobin&#8217;s Q">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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