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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>The Demand Review Committee: How it Works, and How it Could Work Better &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>The Demand Review Committee: How it Works, and How it Could Work Better</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/05/14/the-demand-review-committee-how-it-works-and-how-it-could-work-better/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=the-demand-review-committee-how-it-works-and-how-it-could-work-better</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 14 May 2018 13:15:19 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Boards of Directors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities Litigation & Enforcement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Delaware law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Derivative suits]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Engagement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities litigation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder suits]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[In Delaware, stockholder derivative litigation follows a familiar path. The plaintiff files a complaint, alleging that demand is futile. The defendants move to dismiss under Court of Chancery Rule 23.1, arguing that the plaintiff failed to make a demand on the board of directors to bring the suit on behalf of the corporation. The motion [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Justice Collins J. Seitz, Jr. (Delaware Supreme Court), and S. Michael Sirkin (Ross Aronstam & Moritz), on Monday, May 14, 2018 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">Collins J. Seitz, Jr. is a Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court; and <a href="http://www.ramllp.com/attorneys-Michael-Sirkin.html">S. Michael Sirkin</a> is a Partner at Ross Aronstam &amp; Moritz LLP. This post is based on their recent <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3164959">article</a>, published in <em>The Business Lawyer</em>, and is part of the <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">Delaware law series</a>; links to other posts in the series are available <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p style="font-weight: 400;">In Delaware, stockholder derivative litigation follows a familiar path. The plaintiff files a complaint, alleging that demand is futile. The defendants move to dismiss under Court of Chancery Rule 23.1, arguing that the plaintiff failed to make a demand on the board of directors to bring the suit on behalf of the corporation. The motion is usually coupled with a motion to dismiss under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. If the Court of Chancery grants the motion to dismiss on either ground, the matter ends.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">What happens, though, if instead of pleading demand futility, the plaintiff actually makes a litigation demand? This path appears to be traveled less frequently, and appears to be less well understood by practitioners and directors. By making a demand on the board, the would-be plaintiff concedes that demand is not futile and that a majority of the board is capable of impartially considering the demand. As a result, an aggrieved stockholder who believes that the corporation is sitting on a valuable claim faces a stark choice between making a demand and attempting to plead demand futility.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/05/14/the-demand-review-committee-how-it-works-and-how-it-could-work-better/#more-107243" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading The Demand Review Committee: How it Works, and How it Could Work Better">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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