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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>The Hypocrisy of Hedge Fund Activists &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>The Hypocrisy of Hedge Fund Activists</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/04/the-hypocrisy-of-hedge-fund-activists/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=the-hypocrisy-of-hedge-fund-activists</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/04/the-hypocrisy-of-hedge-fund-activists/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 04 Jun 2018 13:01:47 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Boards of Directors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate Elections & Voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Institutional Investors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Board composition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Board independence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Diversity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Governance standards]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hedge funds]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder activism]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Takeover defenses]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[In virtually every activism campaign, hedge fund activists don the mantle of the shareholders’ champion and accuse the target company’s board and management of subpar corporate governance. This claim to having &#8220;best practices of corporate governance&#8221; at heart is hollow—even hypocritical—as evidenced by at least three examples: hedge fund activists actually undermine the shareholder franchise, [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by  Kai Haakon Liekefett, Sidley Austin LLP, on Monday, June 4, 2018 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.sidley.com/en/people/l/liekefett-kai-he">Kai Haakon Liekefett</a> is Partner at Sidley Austin LLP. This post is based on his recent publication in the 2018 Spring Edition of <em>Ethical Boardroom</em>.</p>
<p>Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <a class="external" href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2291577" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism</a> by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/08/19/the-long-term-effects-of-hedge-fund-activism/">here</a>); <a class="external" href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2921901" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System</a> by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/02/23/who-bleeds-when-the-wolves-bite/">here</a>); and <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3171090">Stock Market Short-Termism’s Impact</a> by Mark Roe, (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/05/31/stock-market-short-termisms-impact/">here</a>).</p>
</div></hgroup><p>In virtually every activism campaign, hedge fund activists don the mantle of the shareholders’ champion and accuse the target company’s board and management of subpar corporate governance.</p>
<p>This claim to having &#8220;best practices of corporate governance&#8221; at heart is hollow—even hypocritical—as evidenced by at least three examples: hedge fund activists actually undermine the shareholder franchise, they weaken the independence and diversity of the board, and they waffle on their anti-takeover protection stance.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/04/the-hypocrisy-of-hedge-fund-activists/#more-107727" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading The Hypocrisy of Hedge Fund Activists">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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