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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>The Rise of the Net-Short Debt Activist &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>The Rise of the Net-Short Debt Activist</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/08/07/the-rise-of-the-net-short-debt-activist/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=the-rise-of-the-net-short-debt-activist</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/08/07/the-rise-of-the-net-short-debt-activist/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 07 Aug 2018 13:01:53 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Accounting & Disclosure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bondholders]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Capital markets]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate debt]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Credit default swaps]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Debtor-creditor law]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder activism]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=109736?d=20180808145911EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The market for corporate debt does not immediately lend itself to the same kind of “activism” found in equity markets. Bondholders, unlike shareholders, do not elect a company’s board or vote on major transactions. Rather, their relationship with their borrower is governed primarily by contract. Investors typically buy corporate debt in the hope that, without [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Joshua A. Feltman, Emil A. Kleinhaus, and John R. Sobolewski, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, on Tuesday, August 7, 2018 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://w3.wlrk.com/jafeltman/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Joshua A. Feltman</a>, <a href="http://w3.wlrk.com/EAKleinhaus/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Emil A. Kleinhaus</a>, and <a href="http://w3.wlrk.com/JRSobolewski/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">John R. Sobolewski</a> are partners at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &amp; Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Feltman, Mr. Kleinhaus, and Mr. Sobolewski.</p>
<p><span class="paragraph">Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2291577">The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism</a> by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/08/19/the-long-term-effects-of-hedge-fund-activism/">here</a>); and <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2921901">Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System</a> by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/02/23/who-bleeds-when-the-wolves-bite/">here</a>).</span></p>
</div></hgroup><p>The market for corporate debt does not immediately lend itself to the same kind of “activism” found in equity markets. Bondholders, unlike shareholders, do not elect a company’s board or vote on major transactions. Rather, their relationship with their borrower is governed primarily by contract. Investors typically buy corporate debt in the hope that, without <em>any </em>action on their part, the company will meet its obligations, including payment in full at maturity.</p>
<p>In recent years, however, we have seen the rise of a new type of debt investor that defies this traditional model. As we previewed <a href="http://www.wlrk.com/files/2018/AcquisitionFinancingBannerYearBehindandNewOpportunitiesintheYearAhead.pdf">here</a>, this investor buys “long” positions in corporate debt not to make money on those positions, but instead to assert defaults that will enable the investor to profit on a larger “short” position. We call this investor a “net-short debt activist.”</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/08/07/the-rise-of-the-net-short-debt-activist/#more-109736" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading The Rise of the Net-Short Debt Activist">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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