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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Citizens United as Bad Corporate Law &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Citizens United as Bad Corporate Law</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/09/12/citizens-united-as-bad-corporate-law/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=citizens-united-as-bad-corporate-law</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/09/12/citizens-united-as-bad-corporate-law/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 12 Sep 2018 13:02:30 +0000</pubDate>
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		<category><![CDATA[Citizens United v. FEC]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=110878?d=20230309151911EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In our paper Citizens United as Bad Corporate Law, we show that Citizens United v. FEC, arguably the most important First Amendment case of the new millennium, is predicated on a fundamental misconception about the nature of the corporation. Specifically, Citizens United v. FEC (558 U.S. 310 (2010), which prohibited the government from restricting independent expenditures [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Jonathan R. Macey (Yale Law School) and Leo E. Strine, Jr. (Delaware Supreme Court and Harvard Law School), on Wednesday, September 12, 2018 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a class="external" href="http://www.law.yale.edu/faculty/JMacey.htm" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Jonathan R. Macey</a> is the Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Corporate Finance &amp; Securities Law at Yale Law School; and Leo E. Strine, Jr. is Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, the Austin Wakeman Scott Lecturer on Law and a Senior Fellow of the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance. This post is based on their recent <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3233118">paper</a>. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2142115" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id%3D2142115&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1536771034190000&amp;usg=AFQjCNFvKMs5okeqxozB7BF8PYedYAJK9w">Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending</a> and <a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=1670085" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=http://ssrn.com/abstract%3D1670085&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1536771034191000&amp;usg=AFQjCNGCel7bG3t1jsPISnyDwhf3xf0GIg">Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?</a>, both by Lucian Bebchuk and Robert Jackson (discussed on the Forum <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/10/02/shining-light-on-corporate-political-spending/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/10/02/shining-light-on-corporate-political-spending/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1536771034191000&amp;usg=AFQjCNFVzUu0BIjz5r9mcVz1qpvyYPC3UA">here</a> and <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/09/08/corporate-political-speech-who-decides/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/09/08/corporate-political-speech-who-decides/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1536771034191000&amp;usg=AFQjCNHqPC3hKBZpIrwo45CvaJ0gFbeN3Q">here</a>), and <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2128608" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id%3D2128608&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1536771034191000&amp;usg=AFQjCNEiOiLQW5Kyz3XakLRjVwT8oajczw">Corporate Politics, Governance, and Value Before and after Citizens United</a> by John C. Coates.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>In our paper <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3233118">Citizens United as Bad Corporate Law</a>, we show that <em>Citizens United v. FEC</em>, arguably the most important First Amendment case of the new millennium, is predicated on a fundamental misconception about the nature of the corporation. Specifically, <em>Citizens United v. FEC (</em>558 U.S. 310 (2010), which prohibited the government from restricting independent expenditures for corporate communications, and held that corporations enjoy the same free speech rights to engage in political spending as human citizens, is grounded on the erroneous theory that corporations are “associations of citizens” (<em>See </em>558 U.S. 310 at 356) rather than what they actually are: independent legal entities distinct from those who own their stock.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/09/12/citizens-united-as-bad-corporate-law/#more-110878" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Citizens United as Bad Corporate Law">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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