<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
	<atom:link href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/10/04/no-long-term-value-from-activist-attacks/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu</link>
	<description>The leading online blog in the fields of corporate governance and financial regulation.</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Mon, 07 Sep 2026 11:30:09 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-US</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=6.5.10</generator>

 
	<item>
		<title>No Long-Term Value From Activist Attacks</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/10/04/no-long-term-value-from-activist-attacks/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=no-long-term-value-from-activist-attacks</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/10/04/no-long-term-value-from-activist-attacks/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 04 Oct 2018 17:37:05 +0000</pubDate>
<!-- 		<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator> -->
				<category><![CDATA[Accounting & Disclosure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Boards of Directors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate Elections & Voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Empirical Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Firm performance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hedge funds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Long-Term value]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Profitability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder activism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder value]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Short-termism]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=111658?d=20181004151752EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[An important new study by Ed deHaan, David Larcker and Charles McClure, Long-Term Economic Consequences of Hedge Fund Activist Interventions, has found that on a value weighted basis, long-term returns are “insignificantly different from zero.” And, nearly all of the positive long-term returns are concentrated in companies that are acquired in the two-year period following the [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Martin Lipton, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, on Thursday, October 4, 2018 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a class="external" title="http://www.wlrk.com/mlipton Ctrl+Click to follow link" href="http://www.wlrk.com/mlipton" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&amp;q=http://www.wlrk.com/mlipton&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1480127716091000&amp;usg=AFQjCNG6xxjNt1L38xbtLtrIeLxck8ImgQ">Martin Lipton</a> is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &amp; Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum authored by Mr. Lipton. <span class="paragraph">Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2291577">The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism</a> by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/08/19/the-long-term-effects-of-hedge-fund-activism/">here</a>).</span></p>
</div></hgroup><p style="font-weight: 400;">An important new study by Ed deHaan, David Larcker and Charles McClure, <em><a href="http://www.wlrk.com/docs/DLM20180919.pdf">Long-Term Economic Consequences of Hedge Fund Activist Interventions</a></em>, has found that on a value weighted basis, long-term returns are “insignificantly different from zero.” And, nearly all of the positive long-term returns are concentrated in companies that are acquired in the two-year period following the activist attack. Also, the authors found that there is no evidence that activist attacks result in long-term improvements in accounting performance measures including, return on equity, return on net operating assets, profit margin, asset turnover, and spread over borrowing costs. They concluded, “In sum, across a large battery of appropriately-matched tests, we fail to find consistent evidence that activists drive changes in accounting-based operating performance.”</p>
<p>The following are the overall conclusions of the study:</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/10/04/no-long-term-value-from-activist-attacks/#more-111658" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading No Long-Term Value From Activist Attacks">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/10/04/no-long-term-value-from-activist-attacks/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
		</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
