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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Do Insiders Time Management Buyouts and Freezeouts to Buy Undervalued Targets? &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Do Insiders Time Management Buyouts and Freezeouts to Buy Undervalued Targets?</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/11/05/do-insiders-time-management-buyouts-and-freezeouts-to-buy-undervalued-targets/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=do-insiders-time-management-buyouts-and-freezeouts-to-buy-undervalued-targets</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 05 Nov 2018 14:02:16 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Accounting & Disclosure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Empirical Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mergers & Acquisitions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Acquisitions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Buyouts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Conflicts of interest]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Controlling shareholders]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fair values]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Firm valuation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Freezeouts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Inside information]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Investor protection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Market timing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Target firms]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=112428?d=20181105092205EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Conflicts of interest arise in management buyouts (MBOs) and freezeouts: the acquirers (managers and controlling shareholders) have an incentive to pay the lowest price to selling shareholders, despite having a fiduciary duty to them. Such conflicts of interest could lead to unfair treatment of public shareholders. For instance, in the buyout of the Dell Inc. [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Jarrad Harford (University of Washington), Jared R. Stanfield (UNSW Business School), and Feng Zhang (University of Utah), on Monday, November 5, 2018 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://foster.uw.edu/faculty-research/directory/jarrad-harford/">Jarrad Harford</a> is Professor of Finance at the University of Washington Foster School of Business; <a href="https://www.business.unsw.edu.au/our-people/jaredstanfield">Jared R. Stanfield</a> is Senior Lecturer at UNSW Australia Business School; and <a href="https://faculty.utah.edu/u0783034-Feng_Zhang/hm/index.hml">Feng Zhang</a> is Assistant Professor at the University of Utah. This post is based on their recent <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2789893">article</a>, forthcoming in <em>Journal of Financial Economics.</em> <span class="paragraph">Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=147568">Adverse Selection and Gains to Controllers in Corporate Freezeouts</a> by Lucian Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan.</span></p>
</div></hgroup><p>Conflicts of interest arise in management buyouts (MBOs) and freezeouts: the acquirers (managers and controlling shareholders) have an incentive to pay the lowest price to selling shareholders, despite having a fiduciary duty to them. Such conflicts of interest could lead to unfair treatment of public shareholders. For instance, in the buyout of the Dell Inc. by its founder and CEO Michael Dell in 2013, some investors believed that “management swoops in to get a good deal right before there’s a change in the business” (Hoffman, 2016). This, and other anecdotal examples suggest that even if they plan to create value post acquisition, managers have incentives to not only negotiate lower premiums (relative to the current market price) but also to initiate deals when the firm is undervalued.</p>
<p>Do managers and controlling shareholders initiate MBOs and freezeouts when the target firm is undervalued? The question is difficult to answer because one cannot observe the value path of the target had it not been acquired. In our article, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X18302071">Do Insiders Time Management Buyouts and Freezeouts to Buy Undervalued Targets?</a>, we circumvent this difficulty by examining the value path of the target&#8217;s industry peers following MBO and freezeout announcements.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/11/05/do-insiders-time-management-buyouts-and-freezeouts-to-buy-undervalued-targets/#more-112428" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Do Insiders Time Management Buyouts and Freezeouts to Buy Undervalued Targets?">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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