<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
	<atom:link href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/11/14/what-the-tesla-settlement-means-for-other-companies/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu</link>
	<description>The leading online blog in the fields of corporate governance and financial regulation.</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Tue, 05 May 2026 11:32:08 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-US</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=6.5.8</generator>

 
	<item>
		<title>What the Tesla Settlement Means for Other Companies</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/11/14/what-the-tesla-settlement-means-for-other-companies/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=what-the-tesla-settlement-means-for-other-companies</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/11/14/what-the-tesla-settlement-means-for-other-companies/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 14 Nov 2018 14:15:26 +0000</pubDate>
<!-- 		<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator> -->
				<category><![CDATA[Accounting & Disclosure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Boards of Directors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities Litigation & Enforcement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Compliance and disclosure interpretation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Disclosure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Elon Musk]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Liability standards]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Oversight]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regulation FD]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Risk]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SEC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SEC enforcement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities enforcement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Settlements]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Social media]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tesla]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=112608?d=20220104125942EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[There have been plenty of press reports about the SEC’s settlement with Elon Musk arising from his tweeting about taking Tesla private. But the concurrent settlement with Tesla itself provides interesting lessons for disclosure and governance at public companies. Tesla agreed to pay a $20 million penalty and agreed to several “undertakings” to strengthen its [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Nick Grabar, David Lopez and Matthew C. Solomon, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, on Wednesday, November 14, 2018 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a class="external" href="https://www.clearygottlieb.com/professionals/nicolas-grabar" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Nicolas Grabar</a>, <a class="external" href="https://www.clearygottlieb.com/professionals/david-lopez" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">David Lopez</a>, and <a href="https://www.clearygottlieb.com/professionals/matthew-c-solomon">Matthew C. Solomon</a> are partners at Cleary Gottlieb Steen &amp; Hamilton LLP. This post is based on a Cleary Gottlieb publication by Mr. Grabar, Mr. Lopez, and Mr. Solomon.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>There have been plenty of press reports about the SEC’s settlement with Elon Musk arising from his tweeting about taking Tesla private. But the concurrent settlement with Tesla itself provides interesting lessons for disclosure and governance at public companies.</p>
<p>Tesla agreed to pay a $20 million penalty and agreed to several “undertakings” to strengthen its governance and controls including a requirement that it add two independent directors to its Board. And, under his own settlement, Musk agreed to step down for three years as chairman of the Board of Directors, although he is allowed to continue as CEO.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/11/14/what-the-tesla-settlement-means-for-other-companies/#more-112608" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading What the Tesla Settlement Means for Other Companies">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/11/14/what-the-tesla-settlement-means-for-other-companies/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
		</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
