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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Fiduciary Blind Spot: The Failure of Institutional Investors to Prevent the Illegitimate Use of Working Americans’ Savings for Corporate Political Spending &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Fiduciary Blind Spot: The Failure of Institutional Investors to Prevent the Illegitimate Use of Working Americans’ Savings for Corporate Political Spending</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/01/04/fiduciary-blind-spot-the-failure-of-institutional-investors-to-prevent-the-illegitimate-use-of-working-americans-savings-for-corporate-political-spending/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=fiduciary-blind-spot-the-failure-of-institutional-investors-to-prevent-the-illegitimate-use-of-working-americans-savings-for-corporate-political-spending</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/01/04/fiduciary-blind-spot-the-failure-of-institutional-investors-to-prevent-the-illegitimate-use-of-working-americans-savings-for-corporate-political-spending/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 04 Jan 2019 13:56:38 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Accounting & Disclosure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate Elections & Voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[HLS Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Institutional Investors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Accountability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Citizens United v. FEC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Disclosure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Index funds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Investor protection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mutual funds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Political spending]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder activism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder voting]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[For decades, American workers have been subjected to increasing pressure to become forced capitalists, in the sense that to provide for retirement for themselves, and to pay for college for their children, they must turn part of their income every month over to mutual funds who participate in 401(k) and 529 programs. These “Worker Investors” [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Tami Groswald Ozery, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Friday, January 4, 2019 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">Leo E. Strine, Jr. is Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, the Austin Wakeman Scott Lecturer on Law and a Senior Fellow of the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance. This post is based on Chief Justice Strine’s recent <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3304611">paper</a>. <span class="paragraph">Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2481061">Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United</a> by Leo E. Strine and Nicholas Walter (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/09/02/the-tension-between-conservative-corporate-law-theory-and-citizens-united/">here</a>);</span><span class="paragraph"> </span><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3281791">The Untenable Case for Keeping Investors in the Dark</a> by Lucian Bebchuk, Robert J. Jackson, Jr., James D. Nelson, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/11/14/the-untenable-case-for-keeping-investors-in-the-dark/">here</a>); and <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/11/28/index-funds-and-the-future-of-corporate-governance-theory-evidence-and-policy/">Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy</a> by Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst (discussed on the forum <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3282794">here</a>).</p>
</div></hgroup><p>For decades, American workers have been subjected to increasing pressure to become forced capitalists, in the sense that to provide for retirement for themselves, and to pay for college for their children, they must turn part of their income every month over to mutual funds who participate in 401(k) and 529 programs. These “Worker Investors” save for the long term, often hold portfolios that are a proxy for the entire economy, and depend on the economy’s ability to generate good jobs and sustainable growth in order for them to be able to have economic security. In recent years, there has been a heartening improvement in the self-awareness of the major mutual fund families—BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street, and Fidelity (the “Big 4”)—that have Worker Investors’ capital. This Big 4 has grown enormously because of the legal pressures that generate capital inflows to them every month from Worker Investors. To their credit, the Big 4 recognize that they have a duty to think and act in a way aligned with the interests of Worker Investors by encouraging the public companies in which they invest to implement business plans that will generate sound long-term growth. In fact, the Big 4 have recently recognized that unless public companies act in a manner that is environmentally, ethically, and legally responsible, they are unlikely to be successful in the long run. Thus, the Big 4 are more willing than ever to second-guess company management to fulfill their fiduciary duties.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/01/04/fiduciary-blind-spot-the-failure-of-institutional-investors-to-prevent-the-illegitimate-use-of-working-americans-savings-for-corporate-political-spending/#more-114192" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Fiduciary Blind Spot: The Failure of Institutional Investors to Prevent the Illegitimate Use of Working Americans’ Savings for Corporate Political Spending">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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