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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Transparency in Corporate Groups &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Transparency in Corporate Groups</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/01/15/transparency-in-corporate-groups/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=transparency-in-corporate-groups</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 15 Jan 2019 14:27:47 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Accounting & Disclosure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Comparative Corporate Governance & Regulation]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[International Corporate Governance & Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Australia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate forms]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Transparency]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[This Article addresses a remarkable blind spot in American law: the failure to apply the well-established principles of secured credit to prevent inefficiency, confusion, and fraud in the manipulation of the webs of subsidiaries within corporate groups. In particular, “asset partitioning” has been a fashionable subject in which the central problem of non-transparency has been [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Jay L. Westbrook (University of Texas at Austin), on Tuesday, January 15, 2019 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://law.utexas.edu/faculty/jay-l-westbrook/">Jay L. Westbrook</a> is the Benno C. Schmidt Chair of Business Law at the University of Texas at Austin School of Law. This post is based on an <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3287378">article</a> by Professor Westbrook, forthcoming in <em>Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial &amp; Commercial Law</em>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>This <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3287378">Article</a> addresses a remarkable blind spot in American law: the failure to apply the well-established principles of secured credit to prevent inefficiency, confusion, and fraud in the manipulation of the webs of subsidiaries within corporate groups. In particular, “asset partitioning” has been a fashionable subject in which the central problem of non-transparency has been often mentioned, but little addressed. This Article offers a concept for a new system of corporate disclosure for the benefit of creditors and other stakeholders. It would require disclosure of corporate structures and allocations of assets among affiliates to the extent the affiliates are to be treated as independent legal entities. Enforcement would follow the secured creditor model: the failure to treat each corporation as an independent entity throughout its life would sacrifice corporate independence. The approach suggested is informed by Australia’s experience with one implementation of such a system.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/01/15/transparency-in-corporate-groups/#more-114208" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Transparency in Corporate Groups">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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