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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Market Power and Inequality &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Market Power and Inequality</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/01/23/market-power-and-inequality/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=market-power-and-inequality</link>
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		<pubDate>Wed, 23 Jan 2019 13:56:45 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Comparative Corporate Governance & Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Empirical Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Equity securities]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Inequality]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ownership]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Stakeholders]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=114453?d=20190723114415EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[For over a century, the idea of the United States as a &#8220;nation of shareholders&#8221; has been a powerful one. This notion has its roots in attempts by the New York Stock Exchange to broaden its political base by ensuring that more Americans owned at least a handful of stocks, and Cold War comparisons of [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Joshua Gans (University of Toronto), Andrew Leigh (Parliament of Australia), Martin C. Schmalz (University of Oxford), and Adam Triggs (Australian National University), on Wednesday, January 23, 2019 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/FacultyAndResearch/Faculty/FacultyBios/Gans.aspx">Joshua Gans</a> is Jeffrey S. Skoll Chair of Technical Innovation and Entrepreneurship and Professor of Strategic Management at University of Toronto Rotman School of Management; <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Senators_and_Members/Parliamentarian?MPID=BU8">Andrew Leigh</a> is a Member of the Parliament of Australia; <a href="https://sites.google.com/site/martincschmalz/">Martin C. Schmalz</a> is Associate Professor of Finance at University of Oxford Saïd Business School; and <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Senators_and_Members/Parliamentarian?MPID=BU8">Adam Triggs</a> is Director of Research at the Asian Bureau of Economic Research at the Australian National University Crawford School of Public Policy. This post is based on their recent <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3301054">article</a>, forthcoming in the <em>Oxford Review of Economic Policy.</em></p>
</div></hgroup><p>For over a century, the idea of the United States as a &#8220;nation of shareholders&#8221; has been a powerful one. This notion has its roots in attempts by the New York Stock Exchange to broaden its political base by ensuring that more Americans owned at least a handful of stocks, and Cold War comparisons of the United States as a shareholding democracy with the central planning of the Soviet Union. The myth of a market dominated by &#8220;mom and pop&#8221; investors has been used to argue that policies which boost corporate earnings are good for all Americans—because all citizens own a stake in America’s corporations.</p>
<p>But stock owners are not a representative cross-section of society. Most stocks are held by the richest. Inequality in stock holding is far more pronounced than inequality in consumption or income. Moreover, while consumption inequality has stayed stable, inequality in corporate equity holdings has grown considerably over the past generation.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/01/23/market-power-and-inequality/#more-114453" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Market Power and Inequality">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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