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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>A Capitalist&#8217;s Solution to the Problem of Excessive Buybacks &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>A Capitalist&#8217;s Solution to the Problem of Excessive Buybacks</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/22/a-capitalists-solution-to-the-problem-of-excessive-buybacks/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=a-capitalists-solution-to-the-problem-of-excessive-buybacks</link>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2019 14:10:04 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[We may not need a government solution to the issue of excessive corporate stock buybacks. We most certainly do not need the solution proposed by Senators Chuck Schumer and Bernie Sanders, requiring companies to adopt minimum wage requirements for hourly workers before buying back stock. What we need is a capitalist solution, removing misaligned incentives, [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Nell Minow, ValueEdge Advisors, on Friday, February 22, 2019 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">Nell Minow is Vice Chair of ValueEdge Advisors. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2895161">Short-Termism and Capital Flows</a> by Jesse Fried and Charles C. Y. Wang (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2895161">here</a>).</p>
</div></hgroup><p>We may not need a government solution to the issue of excessive corporate stock buybacks. We most certainly do not need the solution <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/03/opinion/chuck-schumer-bernie-sanders.html">proposed by Senators Chuck Schumer and Bernie Sanders</a>, requiring companies to adopt minimum wage requirements for hourly workers before buying back stock. What we need is a capitalist solution, removing misaligned incentives, moral hazards, and diversion of assets to make sure the market’s buyback decision is the right one.</p>
<p>The conventional thinking about stock buybacks is that when corporate managers and directors believe the stock is undervalued and do not have a better use for excess capital they should return it to shareholders. No one can argue with that; it is vastly preferable to the usual alternative, overpaying for acquisitions that are not core to the company’s business. That’s a whole different discussion of misaligned incentives.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/22/a-capitalists-solution-to-the-problem-of-excessive-buybacks/#more-115625" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading A Capitalist&#8217;s Solution to the Problem of Excessive Buybacks">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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