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	<title>Dual-Track Processes: How to Turbocharge Your Exit &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Dual-Track Processes: How to Turbocharge Your Exit</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/03/19/dual-track-processes-how-to-turbocharge-your-exit/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=dual-track-processes-how-to-turbocharge-your-exit</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 19 Mar 2019 13:32:01 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[Exiting an investment is an inherently uncertain process. Even for a thriving business with a viable equity story, committed stakeholders and the right advisers, the final deal terms and valuation are typically guided by factors beyond a company’s control. These include prevailing market sentiment, current appetite for acquisitions in a particular sector and the political [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Michal Berkner, Josh Kaufman, and James Foster, Cooley LLP, on Tuesday, March 19, 2019 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.cooley.com/people/michal-berkner">Michal Berkner</a> and <a href="https://www.cooley.com/people/josh-kaufman">Josh Kaufman</a> partners and <a href="https://www.cooley.com/people/james-foster">James Foster</a> is an associate at Cooley LLP. This post is based on their Cooley memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <a class="external" href="https://ssrn.com/abstract=2593866" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">M&amp;A Contracts: Purposes, Types, Regulation, and Patterns of Practice</a>, and <a class="external" href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2133343" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Allocating Risk Through Contract: Evidence from M&amp;A and Policy Implications</a> (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/09/14/allocating-risk-through-contract-evidence-from-ma-and-policy-implications/">here</a>) both by John C. Coates, IV.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>Exiting an investment is an inherently uncertain process. Even for a thriving business with a viable equity story, committed stakeholders and the right advisers, the final deal terms and valuation are typically guided by factors beyond a company’s control. These include prevailing market sentiment, current appetite for acquisitions in a particular sector and the political and economic environment, all of which can change well within a given transaction timetable. In the face of a global economic slowdown, ongoing trade wars, Brexit, heightened market volatility and other sources of uncertainty, it is becoming increasingly important to consider how deals can be run to maximize transaction certainty and achieve optimal valuation.</p>
<p>Pursuing a “dual-track” process involves preparing for an initial public offering at the same time as running a private M&amp;A process, often through an auction. Relative to choosing a single exit strategy, a dual-track process tends to be more complicated and resource-intensive, while also posing some specific risks. However, if the right dynamic is created, a dual-track process can provide visibility of relative valuation and the benefit of optionality, maximizing the chance of securing the most favorable terms. Whether there’s a looming threat of a government shutdown or a sudden stock market sell-off, or the auction bids come in below expectations, the alternative track may present a superior exit option. A dual-track process reduces the possibility that the vagaries of the stock market and industry-specific dynamics will have a detrimental effect on the overall exit by opening the investment opportunity to public markets as well as financial and strategic investors, with each influenced by the others.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/03/19/dual-track-processes-how-to-turbocharge-your-exit/#more-116374" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Dual-Track Processes: How to Turbocharge Your Exit">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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