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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Mutant Q—Foundational Studies on Entrenchment, Staggered Boards, and Activism &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Mutant Q—Foundational Studies on Entrenchment, Staggered Boards, and Activism</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/03/31/mutant-q-foundational-studies-on-entrenchment-staggered-boards-and-activism/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=mutant-q-foundational-studies-on-entrenchment-staggered-boards-and-activism</link>
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		<pubDate>Sun, 31 Mar 2019 12:13:11 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Boards of Directors]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Entrenchment]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder value]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Staggered boards]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=116641?d=20190409165446EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[“If your experiment needs statistics, you ought to have done a better experiment.” — Ernest Rutherford Sometimes you need to get into the fundamentals to understand if your belief system is sound. In corporate governance literature of the last two decades, there is no more fundamental concept than Tobin’s Q, which legions of law professors [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Neil Whoriskey, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, on Sunday, March 31, 2019 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.clearygottlieb.com/professionals/neil-whoriskey">Neil Whoriskey</a> is partner at Cleary Gottlieb Steen &amp; Hamilton LLP. This post is based on a Cleary Gottlieb memorandum by Mr. Whoriskey. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=593423" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">What Matters in Corporate Governance?</a> by Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell.</p>
</div></hgroup><blockquote><p>“<em>If your experiment needs statistics, you ought to have done a better experiment</em>.”<br />
— Ernest Rutherford</p></blockquote>
<p>Sometimes you need to get into the fundamentals to understand if your belief system is sound. In corporate governance literature of the last two decades, there is no more fundamental concept than Tobin’s Q, which legions of law professors have used as a <strong>proxy for firm value.</strong> Based on regression analyses examining variations in Tobin’s Q, they have made definitive pronouncements about any number of corporate governance topics, from staggered boards to the value of activism. Yet tracing the evolution of Tobin’s Q to its current state—a state completely alien to the original conception—reveals a twisted tale, proceeding like an epidemiological disaster in which Tobin’s Q transforms from an innocent and useful organism in macroeconomics to an unrecognizably mutated and widespread disease in corporate governance literature, infecting policies and practices throughout the corporate governance world.<br />
 <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/03/31/mutant-q-foundational-studies-on-entrenchment-staggered-boards-and-activism/#more-116641" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Mutant Q—Foundational Studies on Entrenchment, Staggered Boards, and Activism">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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