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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Delaware&#8217;s New Competition &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Delaware&#8217;s New Competition</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/06/19/delawares-new-competition/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=delawares-new-competition</link>
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		<pubDate>Wed, 19 Jun 2019 12:51:51 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[American corporate law is built on a metaphor of a race: states compete to supply corporate law. For nearly half a century, corporate law scholarship has revolved around endemic questions about whether other states put competitive pressure on Delaware, and whether this competition is normatively desirable. There is a missing piece to this important body [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by William J. Moon (University of Maryland), on Wednesday, June 19, 2019 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.law.umaryland.edu/Directory/profile.asp?id=1178">William J. Moon</a> is Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Maryland. This post is based on his recent <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3395387">article</a>, forthcoming in the <em>Northwestern University Law Review</em>. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=275452" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">The Market for Corporate Law</a> by Oren Bar-Gill, Michal Barzuza, and Lucian Bebchuk; <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=927008">Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from History</a> by Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani; <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2117967" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Delaware Law as Lingua Franca: Evidence from VC-Backed Startups</a> by Brian Broughman, Darian Ibrahim, and Jesse Fried, and (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/01/08/delaware-law-as-lingua-franca-evidence-from-vc-backed-startups/">here</a>); and <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=354783">Delaware&#8217;s Competition</a> by Mark J. Roe.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>American corporate law is built on a metaphor of a race: states compete to supply corporate law. For nearly half a century, corporate law scholarship has revolved around endemic questions about whether other <em>states </em>put competitive pressure on Delaware, and whether this competition is normatively desirable.</p>
<p>There is a missing piece to this important body of scholarship. In my article, <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3395387">Delaware’s New Competition</a> (forthcoming in the <em>Northwestern University Law Review</em> and available on SSRN), I introduce foreign nations as emerging lawmakers that compete with American states in the increasingly globalizing market for corporate law. In recent decades, entrepreneurial foreign nations in offshore islands—principally the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands, and Bermuda—have attracted publicly traded American corporations by offering permissive corporate governance rules and specialized business courts.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/06/19/delawares-new-competition/#more-119145" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Delaware&#8217;s New Competition">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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