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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Can a Public Company Effectively Opt Out of Rule 14a-8? &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Can a Public Company Effectively Opt Out of Rule 14a-8?</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/30/can-a-public-company-effectively-opt-out-of-rule-14a-8/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=can-a-public-company-effectively-opt-out-of-rule-14a-8</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2020 12:41:42 +0000</pubDate>
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		<category><![CDATA[Rule 14a-8]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[For almost eighty years Rule 14a-8 has been an integral part of the regulatory landscape, serving as a widely used means of communication between securityholders and the companies in which they invest. While the rule has been not been without controversy and has been tweaked from time to time, its fundamental objective, i.e., subject to [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Phillip Goldstein, Bulldog Investors, on Monday, March 30, 2020 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">Phillip Goldstein is the co-founder of Bulldog Investors.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>For almost eighty years <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/17/240.14a-8">Rule 14a-8</a> has been an integral part of the regulatory landscape, serving as a widely used means of communication between securityholders and the companies in which they invest. While the rule has been not been without controversy and has been tweaked from time to time, its fundamental objective, i.e., subject to certain specified conditions, the obligation of an issuer of publicly traded securities to include in its proxy materials a proposal submitted by a shareholder, has never faced a serious challenge—until now.</p>
<p>I recognize that companies are concerned about Rule 14a-8 being abused by those seeking to advance (usually left-wing) ideologies. In part, that concern prompted the Securities and Exchange Commission to issue <a href="https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2019/34-87458.pdf">Release No. 87458</a> proposing certain modifications to Rule 14a-8. Yet, while the Commission has been pre-occupied with the finer points of Rule 14a-8 and investors and companies duel it out in comment letters, law firms, led by Skadden Arps, Slate, Meagher &amp; Flom LLP<em>,</em> are quietly promoting a scheme to permit issuers to effectively opt out of the rule entirely.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/30/can-a-public-company-effectively-opt-out-of-rule-14a-8/#more-127832" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Can a Public Company Effectively Opt Out of Rule 14a-8?">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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