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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Director Compensation Practices in the Russell 3000 and S&#038;P 500: 2020 Edition &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Director Compensation Practices in the Russell 3000 and S&#038;P 500: 2020 Edition</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/29/director-compensation-practices-in-the-russell-3000-and-sp-500-2020-edition/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=director-compensation-practices-in-the-russell-3000-and-sp-500-2020-edition</link>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2020 12:46:10 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Boards of Directors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ESG]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Institutional Investors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Board composition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Board oversight]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[COVID-19]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Director compensation]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[At its core, the director role is primarily one of stewardship rather than execution. While “pay for performance” has become a mantra for executive compensation in the last decade, the concept does not extend in the same way to director pay. Rather, director pay structures are oriented toward compensating for time commitments and leadership. Retainers [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Matteo Tonello, The Conference Board, Inc., on Friday, May 29, 2020 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.conference-board.org/publications/bio.cfm?id=358">Matteo Tonello</a> is Managing Director of ESG Research at The Conference Board, Inc. This post relates to a report co-authored by Mr. Tonello with <a href="https://www.semlerbrossy.com/team/mark-emanuel/">Mark Emanuel</a> and <a href="https://www.semlerbrossy.com/team/todd-sirras/">Todd Sirras</a> and published by The Conference Board, <a href="https://www.semlerbrossy.com/">Semler Brossy</a>, and ESG data analytics firm <a href="https://esgauge.com/">ESGAUGE</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>At its core, the director role is primarily one of stewardship rather than execution. While “pay for performance” has become a mantra for executive compensation in the last decade, the concept does not extend in the same way to director pay. Rather, director pay structures are oriented toward compensating for time commitments and leadership. Retainers and per-meeting fees for board and board committee services reflect the time spent on company-related activities. Supplemental retainers for board chairs, lead directors, and board committee chairs reward the additional responsibility of service in leadership positions. To be sure, equity grants are widely used but, rather than being linked to specific performance measures, they are meant more generally to establish an ongoing interest in the long-term prospects of the business.</p>
<p>Yet, today’s corporate directorship is at the forefront of rapidly evolving economic and social changes that are affecting the notion and purpose of the corporation itself. The board slate increasingly represents a diverse array of experiences and viewpoints, while individual directors are asked to exercise judgment and provide coordinated guidance on an expanding set of stakeholder issues. Though compensation is expected to remain rooted in the stewardship function of boards, pay plans will necessarily need to evolve in response to the increased complexity of the independent director role and the level of scrutiny to which it is subject.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/29/director-compensation-practices-in-the-russell-3000-and-sp-500-2020-edition/#more-129927" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Director Compensation Practices in the Russell 3000 and S&#038;P 500: 2020 Edition">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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