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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Redesigning Corporations: Incentives Matter &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Redesigning Corporations: Incentives Matter</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/06/15/redesigning-corporations-incentives-matter/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=redesigning-corporations-incentives-matter</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2020 13:23:25 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Comparative Corporate Governance & Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate Social Responsibility]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ESG]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Benefit corporation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate forms]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate liability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Incentives]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Social contract]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[The Birth of the Corporation: Public Interest Organizations The evolution of the modern corporation is the fascinating story of a series of self-serving legal and societal mutations over hundreds of years, which have morphed the original concept and endowed corporations with freedom of activity, rights, and limitations on liability that would shock their original “inventors”. [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Nicholas Benes, The Board Director Training Institute of Japan, on Monday, June 15, 2020 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://bdti.or.jp/en/contributors/nicholas-e-benes/">Nicholas Benes</a> is founder and Representative Director of The Board Director Training Institute of Japan, and proposed Japan’s Corporate Governance Code.</p>
</div></hgroup><h2>The Birth of the Corporation: Public Interest Organizations</h2>
<p>The evolution of the modern corporation is the fascinating story of a series of self-serving legal and societal mutations over hundreds of years, which have morphed the original concept and endowed corporations with freedom of activity, rights, and limitations on liability that would shock their original “inventors”.</p>
<p>As we all know, for many years most corporations were established by way of an exceptional “charter” by a sovereign, granted only in specific cases where: (a) large amounts of capital were needed (b) to conduct investments and activities that served public or national interests and had good profit potential, but (c) where the risks were so large that few parties would invest if their risk were not shared with many others and/or limited to the amount of money they invested.</p>
<p>In the 1600s and 1700s, the activities that sovereign nations felt met those requirements were the exploration of foreign lands on the other side of the globe, the creation and administration of colonies there, and conducting lucrative trade on long (and dangerous) sea routes to and from those colonies. Thus, the most well-known early corporations include organizations such as the British East India Company (the original “too-big-to-fail company), The Dutch East India Company, the Hudson’s Bay Company, and companies to construct the Erie Canal.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/06/15/redesigning-corporations-incentives-matter/#more-130247" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Redesigning Corporations: Incentives Matter">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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