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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Comment Letter to DOL &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Comment Letter to DOL</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/08/13/comment-letter-to-dol-2/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=comment-letter-to-dol-2</link>
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		<pubDate>Thu, 13 Aug 2020 13:14:58 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[I am writing on behalf of the Council of Institutional Investors (CII), a nonprofit, nonpartisan association of U.S. public, corporate and union employee benefit funds, other employee benefit plans, state and local entities charged with investing public assets, and foundations and endowments with combined assets under management of approximately $4 trillion. Our member funds include [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Jeffrey P. Mahoney, Council of Institutional Investors, on Thursday, August 13, 2020 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">Jeffrey P. Mahoney is General Counsel at the Council of Institutional Investors. This post is based on a CII letter to the Department of Labor. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3544978">The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance</a> by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/02/the-illusory-promise-of-stakeholder-governance/">here</a>) and <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3244665">Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee</a> by Robert H. Sitkoff and Max M. Schanzenbach (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/09/20/the-law-and-economics-of-environmental-social-and-governance-investing-by-a-fiduciary/">here</a>).</p>
</div></hgroup><p>I am writing on behalf of the Council of Institutional Investors (CII), a nonprofit, nonpartisan association of U.S. public, corporate and union employee benefit funds, other employee benefit plans, state and local entities charged with investing public assets, and foundations and endowments with combined assets under management of approximately $4 trillion. Our member funds include major long-term shareowners with a duty to protect the retirement savings of millions of workers and their families, including public pension funds and defined contribution plans with more than 15 million participants—true “Main Street” investors through their funds. Our associate members include non-U.S. asset owners with about $4 trillion in assets, and a range of asset managers with more than $40 trillion in assets under management.</p>
<p>The purpose of this letter is to provide you with our perspectives on the Department of Labor (DOL) “proposed amendments to the ‘Investment duties’ Regulation under Title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (ERISA), to confirm that ERISA requires plan fiduciaries to select investments and investment courses of action based solely on financial considerations relevant to the risk adjusted economic value of a particular investment or investment course of action” (Proposed Rule).</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/08/13/comment-letter-to-dol-2/#more-131992" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Comment Letter to DOL">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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