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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Underwriters Do Not Use Green Shoe Options to Profit from IPO Stock Pops &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Underwriters Do Not Use Green Shoe Options to Profit from IPO Stock Pops</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/02/26/underwriters-do-not-use-green-shoe-options-to-profit-from-ipo-stock-pops/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=underwriters-do-not-use-green-shoe-options-to-profit-from-ipo-stock-pops</link>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 26 Feb 2021 14:00:57 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Capital formation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Capital markets]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Equity offerings]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IPOs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Market reaction]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regulation M]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Underwriting]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Professor Corrigan offers a new theory about why some IPO stocks pop and others suffer steep drops—underwriters are to blame. His “principal trading theory” maintains that, contrary to accepted wisdom, overallotments and green shoe options in IPOs are used to maximize trading payoffs for underwriters. His theory is wrong. Matt Levine, in his Bloomberg column, [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Robert Evans, Locke Lord LLP, on Friday, February 26, 2021 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.lockelord.com/professionals/e/evans-robert">Robert Evans</a> is a partner at Locke Lord LLP. This post is in response to a <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/01/19/footloose-with-green-shoes-can-underwriters-profit-from-ipo-underpricing/">post on the Forum</a> by Professor Patrick M. Corrigan of Notre Dame Law School.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>Professor Corrigan offers a new theory about why some IPO stocks pop and others suffer steep drops—underwriters are to blame. His “principal trading theory” maintains that, contrary to accepted wisdom, overallotments and green shoe options in IPOs are used to maximize trading payoffs for underwriters. His theory is wrong. Matt Levine, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-01-20/green-shoes-look-funny.">in his Bloomberg column</a>, <em>Money Stuff</em>, agrees.</p>
<p>As a matter of market practices and because of the SEC’s Regulation M, underwriters must complete their sales, including overallotments, before the IPO stock starts trading in the market. They cannot, for these reasons, hold back and sell more shares at higher prices in the aftermarket.</p>
<p>Establishing a new and vibrant trading market where one never existed is a challenging task. The investors that a company doing an IPO and its underwriters seek as shareholders have lots of competing ways to invest their money. Even in the same industry as the IPO company, there are competitors with established trading markets a track record of being a public reporting company.</p>
<p>Transforming a privately-held venture into a NYSE- or Nasdaq-traded company involves considerable art as well as science. Underwriters are asking the investors to take on some of the risk of that launch into the unknown of public trading. The dynamics of supply and demand for the shares can influence the success or failure of the company’s entering into the public markets.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/02/26/underwriters-do-not-use-green-shoe-options-to-profit-from-ipo-stock-pops/#more-136421" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Underwriters Do Not Use Green Shoe Options to Profit from IPO Stock Pops">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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